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SCROOGE-THE RELUCTANT STAKEHOLDER:
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I. INTRODUCTION

A Christmas Carolis Charles Dickens' story about the spiritual conversion
of Ebenezer Scrooge.' The story begins with Scrooge miserly guarding his

B.Th., MA, (Distinction), LL.B., MA, LL.M. (Distinction), Lecturer in the School of Law,
University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia. He practiced law in Canada, and has taught business law in
Canada, Mexico and Australia. He would like to thank Simon Fisher of the University of Queensland
for his assistance in developing insight into the topic.
I
CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (Chapman Hall) (1843).

194 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:193
wealth. As the story develops, however, he encounters a series of spirits who
show him the impact of his approach. The happy ending of the story occurs
only after Scrooge sees the harm of his wealth maximizing ways and decides
to benefit the poor family of his employee, Bob Cratchit, with an increase in
salary, a Christmas turkey, and general assistance to his clerk's crippled son,
Tiny Tim. In its essence, A Christmas Carol is an illustration of the
shareholder-stakeholder debate, and that debate is at the heart of corporate
governance.2
Stephen Bottomley, a leading Australian corporate law scholar, observes
that "'[c]orporate [g]overnance' . . . is a slippery term: it is used both in
discussions about the role of companies in society... and also in discussion
about the organization of affairs within companies. ... What one believes
about the role of companies in society determines to a large degree what one
believes about how the affairs of companies should be organized within the
corporation. Essentially, corporate governance asks and attempts to answer
four questions. These questions include: (1) what is the entity being
governed? ;4 (2) by whom should the entity be governed?; (3) what is the best
way to govern the entity?; and (4) in whose interests should the entity be
governed? The shareholder-stakeholder debate is one way of framing these
problems and simultaneously provides a series answers.
The shareholder-stakeholder debate can be analyzed along a number of
different lines. At the most basic level, this debate can be analyzed as a
discussion between monotonic and pluralistic approaches to corporations.
For example, one might ask whether the corporation is a vehicle for
shareholder wealth or an instrument of a broader societal constituency.' The
debate can also be analyzed along cultural lines; for example, Anglo versus
2

Farrar writes, somewhat reflectively, that

[C]orporate governance is about the legitimacy of corporate power, corporate accountability,
and the standards by which the corporation is to be governed, and by who, it is obvious that
the concept transcends legal standards and liability, perhaps reflecting the fact that the law
deals with minimal morality of obligation rather than a morality of aspiration. Corporate
governance is often about the method as opposed to the substance of corporate decisionmaking. Nevertheless it seems too narrow to limit it exclusively to questions of method and
good house keeping.
JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 431 (2002). The
complexity and broad scope of corporate governance is well canvassed in Shann Turnbull, Corporate
Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L. REv. 180, 193 (Oct. 1997).
3
Stephen Bottomley, From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate
Governance, 19 SYDNEYL. REv. 277 (1997).
4
One must assume for the moment, contrary to nexus of contract theorists, that there is an
entity to be governed.
5
Thomas Dunfee, CorporateGovernance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
129 (1999).
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Continental, or Continental versus Asian models.6 Additionally, the debate
can be analyzed along the lines of business management versus legal
obligations,7 as well as with a number of insider and outsider models. One
such model concerns members of the corporate entity compared to nonmembers.' Another insider-outsider model involves thejuxtaposition of the
corporation in opposition to the community. 9 The stakeholder debate may
also be subjected to economic analysis.' 0
The shareholder-stakeholder debate in corporate governance has been
going on for decades, but the intensity of the debate increases as globalization
increases." As corporations come to dominate more of the planet and its
resources, other voices demand to be heard, including those of indigenous
people, women, and even governments, who are concerned about their role
in the global economy and sovereignty itself.12 The increased community of
concerned parties puts additional force behind the stakeholder position. On
the shareholder side, the political advance of the neo-conservatives who are
aligned with the neo-classical economists, such as Milton Friedman, put
their support behind the shareholder model. Additionally, corporate scandals

6

See, e.g., ANDREW KAKABADSE & NADA KAKABADSE, THE GEOPOLITICS OF GOVERNANCE:

THE IMPACT OF CONTRASTING PHILOSOPHIES (2001). Path dependence theories cited by Jennifer Hill,
Introduction:Comparative CorporateGovernanceand Takeovers, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 319-20 n.7 (2002). See also
STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM (Andrew Gamble et al. eds. 1997); FARRAR, supra note 2, at 7 n.2; Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Convergence in CorporateOwnership and Governance, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 127 (1999); Andrea Corfield, The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian CorporateGovernance:
A PreliminaryAnalysis,10 BOND L. REV. 213 (1998), availableathttp://www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/vo110-2/5Corfield.pdf. Compare FARRAR, supra note 2, at 472 ("This is not the end of history of corporate
governance."); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J.
439 (2001).
7
See, e.g., Michael Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 7 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 297 (2001) (discussing the management perspective); Thomas
Donaldson & Lee Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:Concepts, Evidence and Implications, 20
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 65 (1995). However, in the legal literature, the discussion tends to focus as debate
between contractarian and communitarian perspectives of the corporation. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge,
Community And Statism: A Conservative ContractarianCritique Of ProgressiveCorporate Law Scholarship, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997).
8
See FARRAR, supra note 2, at 417; Collin Mayer, Stock Markets: FinancialInstitutions and Corporate
Performance, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 179 (Nicholas Dimsdale ed., 1994).
9
See DAVID KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (2d ed. 2001); JANET DINE,
THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2000); Charlie Weir et. al., Internal andExternal Governance
Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performanceof Large UK Public Companies, 29J. OF BuS. FIN. & ACCT. 579
(2002).
10
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
1
Seegenerally, KORTEN, supra note 9.
12

See, e.g., GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

Dunning ed. 1999).

(John H.
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of increasing size shock, not only the investment community, but also society
at large. 13 For some, the debate is critical, 14 but for others the debate is
dismissed as "bogus." 15
This paper analyzes the shareholder-stakeholder debate. Particular
emphasis is placed on the legal arguments and assumptions behind the
positions taken by the two groups, in addition to the models of corporations,
normative issues of corporate law, and the implications for corporate
governance. Part II provides a history of the shareholder-stakeholder debate.
Part III discusses stakeholder theory, and Part IV discusses shareholder
theory. Part V explains several models of the corporation and the debate
surrounding these models. A normative comment on the nature of the
corporation and corporate law is given in Part VI. Finally, this article
concludes that corporations were never exclusively shareholder focused
because in practical terms they cannot be, and that appropriate corporate law
reform may be the best way to address some of the challenges facing the
global community.
IX.HISTORY OF THE SHAREHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER DEBATE

The shareholder-stakeholder debate can be traced back to Adolph Berle 6
and E. Merrick Dodd's 17 articles in the HarvardLaw Review during the 1930's.
The debate took place against the backdrop of the 1929 stock market crash,
which prompted a deep suspicion among Americans concerning the

13

See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Wwm Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty

Years Later 16 DEL.J. CORP. L. 33 (1991),who stated,
These reexaminations are usually triggered by a dramatic event or series of events and are
initiated by some of those involved in the events whose interests in dealing with those events
would be served by changing the rules. And generally others involved in those events see their
interests served by preserving the rules that have historically guided people.
Id. at 33. See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. 557201-66 (2002) (reacting to public calls for
efforts to improve corporate governance in post-Enron times).
14
Millon sees it as a "crisis" in corporate law. David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law:
Communitarians, Contractarians,and the Crisis in CorporateLaw, 50 WASH.& LEE L.REV. 1373, 1377 (1993).
Dine cites Sullivan and Conlon who refer to a change from contract to constituency models-i.e.
shareholder to stakeholder--of corporations ashaving "created a crisis in corporate governance." DINE,
supra note 9,at35.
15
Adam Reynolds, Do ESOPS Strengthen Employee StakeholderInterests? 13 BOND L.REv. 95, 97
(2001) (quoting Phillip Goldenberg, Shareholders v Stakeholders: the Bogus Argument 19 (2)COMPANY
LAWYER 34,36 (1998) availableat http'//www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/voll3-1/Reynolds.pdf)).
16
A.A. BerleJr.,For 4som CorporateManagersAre Trustees:A Note, 45 HARV. L.REv.1365,1367
(1932).
17
E.MerrickDodd,Jr.,ForWhonAre CorporateManagers Trustees?,45 HARv.L.REv. 1145 (1932)
[hereinafter Dodd,For Wom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?].
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corporations in their midst.'8 Berle took the view that managers need to
consider the views of shareholders. 9 Dodd, however, took the view that
even though the law supported Berle, the concerns of workers should be
considered. a Support for each side in this debate has fluctuated over time,
21
with Berle conceding in 1954 that Dodd was gaining the greater following.
Of course, the debate continues at present. 22 One fundamental issue is who

18

See Sommer, supra note 13, at 36.

19

Id. at 36-37.

20

Dodd wrote that,
[this writer] believes that public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today
making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic
institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function, that this view has
already had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased effect
upon the latter in the near future.
Dodd, For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, supra note 17, at 1148. In response, Professor Berle said,
Now I submit that you can not [sic] abandon emphasis on 'the view that business corporations
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders' until such time as you are
prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.
Berle, For Wom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, supra note 16, at 1367. Berle, supra note 16, at
1367. Professor Berle finished his analysis with this summary,
[u]nchecked by present legal balances, a social--economic absolutism of corporate
administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe; and in any case it hardly affords the
soundest base on which to construct the economic commonwealth which industrialism seems
to require. Meanwhile, as lawyers, we had best be protecting the interests we know, being no
less swift to provide for the new interests as they successively appear.
Id. at 1372. See also Joseph Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation,64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1458 (1964).
21
A. A. Berle, Jr., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954) (conceding that
Dodd was gaining a greater following). See also Lynn Stout, Bad andNot-So-Bad Argumentsfor Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1208-09 (2002). Compare William Beaver, Is the StakeholderModel Dead?
It Looks Like the People Who Hold the Shares are Still Number One in the Mind of CorporateAmerica, 42
BUSINESS HORIZONS 8 (1999) (commenting that stakeholder theory appears to be finished). Berle
remained unconvinced however, that popular acceptance of Dodd's position meant that Dodd's view was
superior or correct. A. A. Berle, Jr., Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, at xii (E.
Mason ed. 1960).
22
Abriefoutline ofthe debate offered in Millon, supra note 14, at 1373. The triumphalist rhetoric
of the shareholder primacy theorists is surprising. Consider, for example, the statement by commentators
Hansmann and Kraakman:
[t]he triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago. Logic
alone did not establish the superiority of this standard model or of the prescriptive rules that
it implies, which establish a strong corporate management with duties to serve the interests of
shareholders alone, and strong minority shareholder protections. Rather, the standard model
earned its position as the dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, by outcompeting during the post-World-War-Il period the three alternative models of corporate
governance: the managerialist model, the labor-oriented model, and the state-oriented model.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 468.
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should be included as a stakeholder. At one end of the spectrum are scholars
and investors who argue that the only stakeholder to be considered is the
shareholder. At the other end of the spectrum are those scholars who would
include even the most inanimate objects in the physical environment as
stakeholders. 3 One definition ofa "stakeholder," which is generally accepted,
is R. Freeman's definition. He explained that, "[a] stakeholder ... is [by
definition] any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization's objectives."24 Others, however, interpret
the stakeholder model as one in which a corporation is governed by
individuals, who are vital to the success and survival of the enterprise. 25 For
purposes of this paper, stakeholder will mean those
individuals directly affected
26
corporation.
the
of
decisions
and
acts
the
by
The positions of shareholder and stakeholder reflect a number of
different concerns.
Scholars and business interests, who favor the
shareholder to the exclusion of all other stakeholders, are "minimalist pure
stockholder[s]."27 Minimalist pure stockholders argue that corporate law
"should be minimal, i.e., limited to little more than enforcing contracts and
preventing fraud, theft, and coercion. Such theories also declare that
managers have a fiduciary obligation to stockholders." 2' These stockholders
believe in the market and Adam Smith's 29 "invisible hand" in a manner that
could be described as nearly religious." At the other extreme are scholars
who probably merit the supposedly pejorative epithet of a communist.
The stakeholder debate is complicated by the amount of involvement by
the stakeholder. Is it a matter of control, voice, or consideration? As

23

See, e.g., Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of StakeholderTheory, 5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Jan.
1997), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com.
24

R Edward Freeman, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984).

25

For example, the "strictly business" stakeholders ofthe General Electric Company in the 1930's
were seen as being "customers, employees, managers, and shareholders." Max B. E. Clarkson, A
StakeholderFramework ForAnalyzingAnd Evaluating CorporateSocial Performance,20 THE ACAD. OF MGMT.
REV. 92, 106 (1995).
26
This position has been selected as it is minimalist and, as such, the least controversial of the
stakeholder positions.
27
David Wood, Whom Should Business Serve? 14 AUST. J. CORP. LAW 262, 272 (2002) (quoting
Bruce Langtry, Stakeholdersand the Moral Responsibilitiesof Business, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 431 (1994)).
2s
Bruce Langtry, Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilitiesof Business, 4 BuS. ETHICS Q. 431,434
(1994).
29
Wood, supra note 27, at 2 n.3. Adam Smith only refers to the invisible hand once in THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS, and is more moderate in his views than commonly presented by neo-liberals. See
generally ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
30
See DINE, supra note 9, at 110-11 (discussing Cooter's analysis of Coase's Theorem); Harvey

Cox, The Market as God, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1999, at 18. See also Linda McQuaig, ALLYOU CAN EAT
224 (2001) (discussing the new capitalists view of Smith's theories).
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business professor Gerald Vinten notes, "There is no such thing as a
tradeable stakeholding certificate, and neither is there any direct legal
requirement [to consider stakeholders].,, 3 ' The lack of consensus on the
stake in question certainly makes for a more muddled debate.
Another dimension to the debate derives from economists, who view the
debate from the perspective of efficiency. Some have challenged stakeholder
theory on the basis that stakeholder laws or "constituency states," such as
anti-takeover legislation and non-exclusive wealth-maximizing, create
distortions in the market harming the efficiency of the market and reducing
overall social wealth, and hence, the overall well-being of society.32 Other
economists claim that stakeholder theory more accurately reflects the
situation by having internalized more costs, which current accounting
principles inappropriately externalize. 33
Another aspect of the debate is introduced when one examines the nature
of the corporation and its consequent role in society. Is the corporation
merely a legal recognition afforded to a natural aggregation of business
people, or is it a concession granted by government for the public good?
Economists and law and economics scholars advocate the former position
and believe that the corporation can stand as a nexus-of-contracts model.34
These thinkers view the corporation as nothing more than a series of
contracts between individuals and as having no separate existence apart from
the contractors.35 Lawyers, environmentalists, and business ethicists who
look at corporate legal history as a way of supporting broader social
responsibility advocate the latter position. 6 The legal aspect of the debate
becomes more complex as one examines various legal concepts of corporate
law arising from rulings, such as Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.,3 and even
more so when one examines the normative issues of corporate law.3"
The discussion takes on a different dimension when one examines the
views of management theorists and practitioners. Such parties are concerned

31
32

Gerald Vinten, The StakeholderManager,38 MGMT. DECISION 377, 377 (2000).
See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 7; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase

Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
33
See, e.g., Bryan Horrigan, Fault Lines in the Intersection Between Corporate Governanceand Social
Responsibility, 25 U.N.S.W. L.J. 515 (2002). See also Wood, supra note 27.
34
FARRAR, supra note 2, at 30 n.69 (stating that concept was pioneered by Coase).
35

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAw (1991).
36
See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, The Complexity andLegitimacy of CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.

1565,1623 (1993); MAX CLARKSON, A RISK BASED MODEL OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY (1994); Horrigan,
supra note 33, at 551-53.
37
[1897] AC 22.
38
FARRAR, supra note 2, at 28.
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with the practical matters of profitability, accountability, and control. These
interests and concerns are intertwined with some of the interests and
concerns of corporate lawyers. The discussion in this area considers, among
other things, the best way to control the corporation and generally frames the
discussion in terms of internal or external forms of regulation.39
In dealing with the shareholder-stakeholder debate, another discussion
comes into play. The issue concerns the role of government in dealing with
corporations and the various interests they represent. Is the role of
government to facilitate the market and the invisible hand as a shareholder's
advocate, or is the government's role to regulate corporations to promote the
common-good for the benefit of the stakeholders?
The stakeholder debate is multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary, interconnected, and in some aspects it is circular.4' Government, as the ultimate
external control, needs direction from the public and from scholars on the
nature, purpose, and functioning of the corporation in order to develop
appropriate systems to do its job of governing the nation. The role of
government is made more complex by the influence of corporations and, of
course, the debate on the proper role of government in the first place.
MII. STAKEHOLDER THEORY

A. Originsand History
As a legal concern, stakeholder theory goes back to Dodd4 and concerns
arising out of the Great Depression. However, stakeholder theory as a
management concern can be traced back to at least 1963, where the Stanford
Research Institute used the theory in an internal memorandum on
management to signify "those groups without whose support the
organization would cease to exist." 42 Since that time, stakeholder theory has
waxed and waned in popularity as the political landscape has shifted between
social and liberal poles and the economy has either expanded or contracted.
Generally, more socially concerned governments in challenging economic
times will advance laws supporting stakeholder concerns.4' Contemporary

See generally Dine, supra note 9, ch. 4.
In this paper, the author will not distinguish between the various particularities of corporate
law in Anglo jurisdictions because the fundamental concerns and issues are the same: the nature of the
corporation and its role in society.
41
See Dodd, supra note 17.
Freeman, supra note 24, at 56.
42
39
4

43

See Peter Drucker, Will The CorporationSurvive? Yes, But NotAs We Know It, THE ECONOMIST,

Nov. 9, 2001, available at http://www.cfo.conVprintable/article.cfnm3001916.

Leading management
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management theories dealing with employee empowerment, 360
evaluations, 44 and TQM circles 4 may well be expressions of the stakeholder
view.46
A general review of the stakeholder literature leads one to conclude that
stakeholder theorists argue four points. First, they advocate that the
corporation is a concession from the government and an independent entity
in itself. 47 If the corporation is a government grant and not simply an
acknowledgement of spontaneous social organization as the contractarians
argue, then the government has a right to control and define the proper
purposes and structure of the corporation. a Second, stakeholder theorists
argue that the corporation should be governed by those affected by the
decisions and actions of the corporation. 49 This view is discussed as the
political view of the corporation.50 Essentially, the argument derives from
basic democratic theory. Third, these theorists believe that the best way to
govern the corporation is by having decision making structures in place that
permit those affected by the decisions at least a voice, if not some control, on
the decisions made.5 ' Finally, the theorists contend that the corporation
2
should be governed in a way that promotes the overall social good.
B. Assumptions and Criticism
1. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STAKEHOLDER THEORY

Stakeholder theory embodies the idea that the corporation is an entity
that has profound effects on society. On that basis, those affected should
have some influence or control over the corporation. The theory is based on

scholar, Peter Drucker, observes that the shareholder primacy model is a "fair-weather" model (last visited
February 20, 2005).
"
A 360 evaluation is an evaluation in which all members of a team or party who are in contact
and available to assess and offer criticism of a person do so.
45
TQM circles are groups of employees who collaborate together to solve problems and increase
the quality of the product or service.
4
See MICHAEL CZINKOTA, ILKKA RONKAINEN & MICHAEL MOFFET, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: UPDATE 2003 at 493-97 (2003), for a discussion of employee involvement in corporate
governance in various countries and the related management theories.
47
See Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391, 401-11
(1997).
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Freeman, supra note 24.
SeeJennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder,48 AM.J. COMP. L. 39, 51-57 (2000).
Id. at 53.

This is the general view of the communitarians. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 890.
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fundamental legal principles and beliefs, including the idea that one must
bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Economics and
efficiency are not ultimate values, and there must be a voice in the
distribution of cost and benefits for society's resources. 3
2. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY
Elaine Sternberg may be considered one of the champions among
stakeholder critics.' 4 As the leading spokesperson opposing stakeholder
theory, her arguments merit analysis. Sternberg's criticism of stakeholder
theory has four main areas of contention." She argues that the stakeholder
theory is incompatible with business and corporate governance, that the
stakeholder theory of accountability is unjustified, and that stakeholder
theory undermines private property, agency, and wealth. Sternberg's
criticisms are by no means an exhaustive list of the criticisms of stakeholder
theory; however, they are representative of general issues.5 6
Sternberg's primary contention is that the "stakeholder theory... wholly
She argues that business requires
precludes the activity of business ....
maximizing long-term owner value." In contrast, the balancing requirement
of stakeholder theory precludes such favoritism and this, by definition,
obviates business. 9 Sternberg claims that the stakeholder theory is
unworkable because the number of stakeholders is infinite, and given all the
competing interests, the identification of what should be counted as a benefit
"S

Bottomley, supra note 3, at 290 (quoting M. Stokes, Company Law and Legal Theory, in
(1986)).
5
Jensen, supra note 7, at 298 n.2. Sternberg is a former investment banker turned philosopher.
She includes in her argument certain legal grounds for opposing stakeholder theory. Her view of the
stakeholder theory as some type of heretical cult can be seen from the title of her article, StakeholderTheory
Exposed, 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Q., 4 (1996). It is interesting to note that few lawyers seem to
oppose stakeholder theory-at least not on legal grounds as the nexus of contracts model is the dominant
model. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 35. Perhaps this reflects an understanding that the law
does not exist a priori, but follows from determined policy decisions, or alternatively, that law does have
an inherent obligation of social justice. See also Friedman, supra note 32;Jenson, supra note 7.
55
See Sternberg, supra note 23. Criticisms of stakeholder theory are generally variations on these
same themes, whether the criticisms arise from legal scholars, economists, business theorists or others.
See, e.g., Anant Sundaram &Andrew Inkpen, The CorporateObjective Revisited, 15 ORGANIZATION SCI. 350
(2004). See also Friedman, supra note 32; Jensen, supra note 7.
5
Sternberg, supra note 23. See, e.g., Corfield, supra note 6, (identifying eight); Sundaram &
Inkpen, supra note 55, (identifying five).
57
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 4.
53

TWINING, LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 180 (Wed.)

58

s9

Id.
Id.
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is not identifiable. 0 Since stakeholder theory has no means of weighing or
balancing the competing interests of various stakeholders, the balancing task
demanded by stakeholder theorists is impossible.6 Essentially, Sternberg is
challenging the nature and purpose of corporations.
Furthermore, Sternberg argues that stakeholder theory is incompatible
with corporate governance. 62 In her view, accountability of directors to
shareholders is the central issue in corporate governance, where as "an
essential principle of stakeholder theory [is] that corporations should be
equally accountable to all their stakeholders."6' Clearly, if one accepts her
view of accountability and corporate governance, she is correct that
stakeholder theory is incompatible with corporate governance.
In regards to the argument on accountability, Sternberg finds that
stakeholder theory "gives full rein to arrogant and unresponsive
management"' and assists in exploitation of corporations by management by
failing to provide a single clear criterion forjudgment ofperformance. 6' The
stakeholder theory requires management to reject the obligations to owners
that they accepted when taking their management jobs. 66 Thus, "[a]s the
67
property of its owners, a business is properly accountable only to them."
Finally, Sternberg claims that stakeholder theory undermines private
property rights by denying owners of private property the right to deal with
it as they choose. 68 If corporations act in the interests of anyone but the
shareholders, corporations are converting and/or curtailing the private
property rights of the owners. 69 This argument has significant legal
implications and focuses the debate on a critical point-the underlying
political views or agendas of the two positions. The noted corporate law
scholar Millon observes:
[Stakeholder theorists] characterize the debate as a disagreement
over whether it is appropriate to use mandatory rules to impede
shareholder wealth maximization in order to benefit other corporate
constituent groups or other affected interests outside the corporate
60

Id.

61

Id.

62
63

Sternberg, supra note 23, at 5.
Id. (emphasis added).

64

Id.

65

See id.

66
67

Id.
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 6. Sternberg also briefly addresses corporate performance, Kantian

moral theory, parallels with government, and social contract arguments for extra-corporate accountability.
68
Id. at8.
69
Id.
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enterprise. For contractarians [shareholder theorists], such rules
represent an unjust imposition on the liberty of shareholders to
pursue their own interests. They have made this point by criticizing
communitarian [stakeholder] corporate law reform as the reallocation of wealth from shareholders to non-shareholders.7 °
Sternberg applies Millon's propositions to the law of agency. Sternberg
holds that the directors and managers of corporations are agents of the
shareholders. 71 Accordingly, stakeholder theory, which allows corporations
to act independently of or contrary to the wishes of shareholders,
undermines the duty of the agent to the principal.7 z She argues that these
two pillars of law underlie the success of western economies and political
liberties; and therefore, these pillars must be protected by rejecting
stakeholder theory. The law as it stands in support of capitalist, free market
economies is correct and should be carefully guarded.
Sternberg concludes her attack on stakeholder theory with ad hominem
arguments73 that seem to characterize opponents of stakeholder theory.74 She
opines, "stakeholder theory seems to offer a free lunch; it attracts those
would like to enjoy the benefits of business without the discipline... [and]
those with most to gain from avoiding accountability: business managers...
[and] promoters of worthy 'causes,' who believe they would be the
beneficiaries."75 Perhaps this type of personal and emotional attack reflects
the very deep and personal ideologies that underlie the debate, which shall
be addressed later in this paper.
Sternberg believes that stakeholder theory is fundamentally flawed
because the theory does not make directors responsible to owners,7 6 which
is the classic Berle and Means agency problem.' Her concern is that the
70
71

Millon, supra note 14, at 1383-84.
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 8-9.
72
Indeed, as Sommer observes: "it may be reasonably concluded that the legislature intended to
do something common law did not do in affording directors flexibility in fending off a hostile tender
offer-namely, favor non-shareholders over shareholders." Summer, supra note 13, at 43.
73
An adhominen argument is an attack on the person making the argument instead of addressing
the substance of the argument itself.
74
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 8-9. See alsoJensen, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that "Stakeholder
theory gives them [socialists] the appearance of legitimate political access to the sources of decision
making power."). Millon, supra note 14, at 1388 (observing that "[t]he ideology and psychological
predispositions that turn many corporate law scholars away from these kinds of inquires explain the
inability of at least some contractarians to acknowledge the crisis in corporate law.").
75
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 8-9.
76
77

Id. at5.
See generally ADOLF BERLE& GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (1968). Berle and Means identified the problem as the power of corporate managers to service
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agents will act in their own self-interest.78 In Sternberg's view, directors
cannot have any true accountability, unless the shareholder directly and
exclusively supervises them. 79 Empirical studies of self-interest in
management action and decision-making suggest that Sternberg is being
driven by ideology more than evidence.80 Studies indicate that managerial
motivation is far more complex, because it includes aspects of altruistically
motivated behavior along with self-interested behavior."
2

C. Replies to Stakeholder Criticism1

Many critics have sharply criticized the stakeholder theory. The strength
of these criticisms revolves primarily around the above-noted issues of
accountability and current legal norms. This portion of the article provides
individual replies to each of the criticisms, which are easily understood when
posed in interrogatory form as follows. First, is stakeholder theory contrary
to business? For stakeholder theory to be against business, one must accept
a certain definition of business, and more particularly, a certain theory of the
corporation. If the corporation is, as economists argue, a nexus-ofcontracts,83 then there may be some credence to the argument. One must
accept, however, that the appropriate and exclusive object of business is the
increase of wealth for owners of the business.84 In addition, one must also
exclude the wealth of any other party, including the general social benefit as

their own interests without regard to the interests of the shareholders.
78
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 8.
79

Id. at 5-8.
The literature on motivation in management is considerable and includes such motivating
factors as trust, feeling appreciated, a desire to belong to a group, and personal acceptance. Joseph
Badaracco & Richard Ellsworth, Leadership, Integrity and Conflict, 30 MGMT. DECISION 29
(1992). Badaracco and Ellsworth observe:
they (business leaders) also believed that these forces fail to explain fully the motivation of the
high-caliber individual they sought for their organizations. Leaders understand that people
need to find meaning in life through their work and that meaning is derived from creativity
in the service of worthwhile purposes. Strong personal ethics, a positive belief in others, and
a compelling vision were other characteristics of successful corporate leadership.
Id. at 31. In addition, one can consider Winter's theory that management looks to advance shareholder
interests even where contrary to management self-interest. Ralph K. Winter, The "Race to the Top"
Revisited: a Commentary on Eisenberg,89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989).
s
Badaracco & Ellsworth, supra note 80, at 31.
9
See Vinten, supra note 31 (replying to Sternberg's four objections).
83
See Coase, supra note 10.
84
For example, Jensen argues that business can have but one objective and to require managers
to coordinate more objectives, and in particular, conflicting objectives, will cause complications to the
point of immobilization. Jensen, supra note 7, at n.7
80
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being of interest or importance."' Furthermore, as will be discussed in
greater depth, the situation is not clear as to whether the long-term
stockholder interest should have priority over short-term stockholder
interest, or whether shareholders are "owners" that have a unique or special
position in the corporation.
Clearly, these assumptions are suspect. Not all members of society, or
even a business, would agree that the only purpose of business is to increase
wealth for shareholders. Neither would many say that the well-being of
society as a whole is irrelevant or that any particular group of shareholders
should be favored over others. For example, Farrar, who is a leading
international corporate law scholar, laments about "the unsatisfactory state
of affairs" in his authoritative analysis of the corporation. s6 Farrar outlines
the mutations of the idea of the corporation and its purposes over time, and
states that this also adds to the uncertainty in the proper identification of the
nature and purposes of the corporation.87 H.LA. Hart, arguably the most
distinguished jurist of the twentieth century, observed that none of the
theories of the corporation (sociological, economic, or legal) adequately
Theories of the corporations include
explains the phenomenon. 8
sociological, economic, and legal theories. One can further analyze the
corporation in terms of culture, power, politics, and cybernetics. 89 Therefore, without any consensus concerning a foundational understanding of the
corporation or its purpose, one has difficulty seeing how Sternberg's
criticism can stand. Stakeholder theory is merely outside of Sternberg's
paradigm for the corporation.
Sternberg also argues that stakeholder theory is contrary to corporate
governance and is based on the issue of accountability."
To be equally

Later in this paper I will address the challenge that the increasingly unequal distribution of
wealth creates for those who argue that overall wealth increases the social wealth of a country. See, e.g.,
Jensen, supra note 7, at 302-04. Cf.generally, Stephen Bottomley, Taking CorporationsSeriously: Some
Considerationsfor CorporateRegulation, 19 FED. L. REV. 203 (1990); Janet Dine, Risks and Systems: A New
Approach to CorporateGovernanceand the European Employee ConsultationStructures? 3 INT'L & COMP. CORP.
L.J. 299,302 n.11 (2001); Cf generally, Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
8
Farrar, FrankensteinIncorporated or Fool's Parliament?Revisiting the Concept of the Corporation in
CorporateGovernance, 10 BOND L. REv. 142, 161 (1998), availableat http://www.bond.edu.aulaw/blr/vol1085

2/2-Farrar.pdf [hereinafter Frankenstein].
87
Id. at 144-45.
88
H.LA. HART, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY at 21-48 (1983).
89
See, e.g., Tumbull, supra note 2, at 193-96.
90
Sternberg, supra note 23, at 5-8. See also Jensen, supra note 7, at 300 (arguing that from a
management perspective, stakeholder theory is impossible because it requires management to consider
more than one interest).
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accountable to all, she argues, is to be accountable to none.9' This argument
is a straw-man argument.' Stakeholder theory, to the extent that one can
speak of unanimity of views, does not advocate equality of all interests or the
view this extreme position implies, which is the rejection of the profit
motive.9 3 Judges and legislatures balance conflicting interests by regularly
examining policy objectives, among other things.9
In fact, as noted by Professor Henry Hu in his award winning study,
corporate directors already do just that: they attend to more than a single
objective. 9 These answers, however, are not to denigrate the seriousness of
the criticism. Stakeholder theory does have a considerable challenge to
address when the issues arise of how and to whom the corporation should
be accountable. Alternative answers lie in corporate governance structures in
non-Anglo corporations. Some examples include the German two-tiered
board that permits employees a strong voice in decision-making, and the
Japanese model that permits a tripartite objective for the corporation. More
Anglo solutions lie in the "Triple Bottom Line" idea (profit, environmental
protection, and social good), which seems to be gaining some acceptance, at
least in Australia.97
The most fundamental legal challenge to stakeholder theory comes from
Sternberg's criticism of property and agency law.98 These criticisms go back
to the Berle and Dodd debate in which Berle cautioned against the
stakeholder view, which "requires little analysis to make clear the fact that
private property as understood in the capitalist system is rapidly losing its
original characteristics. " 99 If one accepts, however, that all rights, except the

9'
92

Steinberg, supra note 23 at 5-8.
A straw man argument is an argument where the protagonist sets up a false opponent and then
easily dismantles the ostensible arguments being put forward by the opponent.
93
For example, Dunfee, supra note 5, at 129 n.2, suggests a plurality of interests none of which
rejects or precludes the profit motive.
94
For example, Judge Richard Posner finds economics as the policy driving force behind legal
rationales. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTIcE (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
POSNER].

9

Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time andFiduciaryPrinciplesin CorporateInvestment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277
(1994) (discussing the complexity of the concept of profit and demonstrating how the profit motive itself
is not a single objective).
%
"Japanese communitarian capitalism ... [has] three intertwined strands of the common
good-i.e. the pursuit ofhappiness and prosperity, the concern forjustice and fairness, and the affirmation
and importance of community." Horrigan, supra note 33, at 542.
97
Id. at 543.
%
Steinberg, supra note 23, at 8-9.
99

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 72, at 247.
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right to life,"°° are circumscribed and that no rights are absolute, then there
is no reason that the right to private property should be any different. In fact,
the law recognizes many limitations on private property rights. For example,
the law recognizes the state's right to appropriate land or to prohibit the
ownership of another human being and where and how one may drive their
car. Additionally, if one accepts that the corporation is not the property of
the stakeholder, but an independent entity in which the stakeholder has only
three rights (voting, dividends, and residue), then the criticism from property
and agency law does not stand. Sternberg's view of law appears naive. Her
argument appears to presume that law in some manner is a priori 1 and has
followed a logical non-ideological path. In her view, the law of property,
agency and corporations stand independent of critical scrutiny and
accordingly, efforts by stakeholder advocates to change the status quo are
somehow illegitimate encroachments on the way things are supposed to be.
Law is the product of its particular time °2 and involves certain styles of
thinking by a limited group of people, who are usually a propertied,
privileged class with less concern for those less fortunate." 3
IV. SHAREHOLDER THEORY

To avoid a straw-man argument,""4 as Sternberg created in her criticism
of stakeholder theory, the discussion of shareholder theory must start with
a caveat. In all but its most extreme versions, the shareholder theory does not
require that every other party be ignored and every possible action to advance
profit be taken. 5 Rather, the theory requires that primacy be given to the
literature, shareholder
shareholder. Accordingly, in at least American10 legal
6
theory is referred to as "shareholder primacy."

100

This is a highly controversial matter in current USA society and law following from the recent

Terri Schiavo case.
101 A pre-existent and assumed state of affairs.
102 As Sommer observes, "[t]he truth isthat its content isconstantly shifting, and notwithstanding
the best efforts ofjustices to link their present decision making with the past in an effort to make it appear
that nothing has changed, the truth is that change has occurred." Sommer, supra note 13, at 33.
103
This concern is central to much of the Critical Legal Studies scholarship. Mocking the
supposed equality of the law, Anatole France said "[tihe law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as
well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE
RED LILY (1894). The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 292 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
104

See Sternberg, supra note 23.

105 Shareholder theory does not, for example, require a corporation to hire "a hitman to murder
the key witness against the firm in a major product liability case." Dunfee, supra note 5, at 132.
106

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16

TRANSNAT'L LAw 45

(2002).
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Shareholder primacy views the corporation's objective as maximizing
shareholder wealth. Business scholars refer to this wealth maximization as
the "corporate objective function."' °7 Although shareholders can be viewed
or characterized in a number of different ways,0" for purposes of this debate,
the view that most accurately represents the situation under discussion is the
shareholder-as-investor view. The shareholder in this model is nothing
more than a party looking for an increase in share value or dividends. This
shareholder has no interest in the corporation as a business and no interest
in how individuals act as directors, so long as they receive an acceptable
return on investment. Shareholders in this model most accurately reflect the
idea of shareholder in the shareholder primacy literature.
Shareholder primacy theorists advance a number of arguments in
support of their position. These theorists argue: (1) corporate governance is
a mere collection of contracts the terms of which govern the actions of the
individuals involved, and therefore, no entity exists to govern; (2)
corporations should be governed by shareholder appointees, such as
directors; (3) the best way to govern the corporation is by a board of directors
elected by and accountable to the shareholders; and (4) the corporation
should be governed for shareholder wealth maximization. 10 9 In sum, the
corporation is a bare contractual arrangement made for the benefit and
control of the shareholder.
A- Originsand History
From the perspective of legal theory, one could argue that the primacy
of shareholder rights arise from doctrines of private property. John Locke
argued that private property is carved out of the common property based on
a person's amount of labor. Locke stated, "[I]t hath by this labour something
annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men."" 0 In other
words, private property is derived from the direct connection of one's hands
and the physical article, in which one has an ownership right; this is the right
to exclusive use."' Justice Wilson wrote in the 1766 property case of

107

See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 7.

108

See Hill, supra note 50, at 42-64 (identifying seven models or views of shareholders:

owner/principal, beneficiary, bystander, participant in a political entity, investor, Cerberus, and managerial
partners).
109

Seegenerally Bainbridge, supra note 7.

110

JOHN LOCKE, SECONDTREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 185-86 (Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690).

II

Id. at 186. Interestingly, Locke uses the example of the activity of one's servant without
explaining how that person becomes a servant in the first place.
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Cornwallisv. Houghton, 12
' concerning landowners denial of gleaning rights to
commoners, that "the soil is his, the seed is his and in natural justice his also
is the profit." 113 This view of private property rights lends credence to the
argument that the rights of ownership of capital led to the right to manage
the enterprise. This view provided a stronger argument at a time when
capital and management were more closely linked." 4 In corporate law, one
finds that the shareholders were historically those who invested their private
property and money into a common fund, such as a joint stock company,
with a view towards profit." 5
Changes in corporate law, however, increased the separation between
owners of financial capital and the income generating assets of the business.
In both Santa Clara County v. South PacificRailroad 1 6 and Salomon v. Salomon
& Co., 11 7 a case decided in the United Kingdom, the courts gave the corporation an independent personality. This personality existed, held property, and
incurred liability in its own right. The corporation had complete
independence from the shareholders and other members of the corporate
entity. This change in the law permitted management to ignore the broader
concerns of the general commercial environment, which included creditors
narrowed the focus to those
and employees. Additionally, the change
8
interests of the "owner" shareholders."
Prior to these court decisions, corporations did not have independent
legal personalities, and hence, they were not able to sustain a legal action
independently of the shareholders. Nor was limited liability a feature of
corporations until 1855."9 With the combined benefits of independent legal
personality and limited liability, shareholders no longer needed to consider
any other interests. There was no greater personal financial risk in refusing
to consider other interests, than the risk already accepted by making the
investment in the corporation in the first place. As a result, people could
become investors, carefree of corporate action and its consequences, except

112
113
114

See E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON (1991) at 139-42, 169.
McQuaig, supra note 30, at 209 (quoting E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON (1991)).
See DINE, supra note 9, at 6. See generally Hill, supra note 50 (suggesting that such closeness of

shareholder and management in earlier times could be "another myth of corporate law"). See also Wood,
supranote 27, at 275 (discussingAdam Smith's comments on passive, uninterested, uninvolved investors).
115
FARRAR, supra note 2, at 158.
116

118 U.S. 394 (1886).

117

[1897] AC 22.

118

FARRAR, supra note 2, at22.

119

See DINE, supra note 9, at5 (offering 1844 as the date of incorporation by registration and 1855

as the date of limited liability). See also FARRAR, supra note 2, at 9 (offering 1844 as the date that the UK's
Companies Act first conferred limited liability).
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for a return on capital. 2 ' While this phenomenon, as anticipated by Smith
and Marx, 121 is neither new nor unexpected, it creates certain problems.
These problems particularly include the agency problem, and for some, a
moral problem."2 Some individuals have suggested the phenomenon also
carries a legal problem. As Wood states:
Berle and Means point out that having 'surrendered control and
responsibility' over corporate assets, shareholders had 'surrendered
the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole
interest' and 'released the community from the obligation to protect
them to123the full extent implied in the strict doctrine of property
'
rights.
If Berle and Means are correct on this issue, their comment suggests a rather
different view of shareholders' rights that seems oddly to have escaped
attention.
Over time, corporate law came to reflect this single focal point 124 and
more attention was paid to director accountability for the shareholders.
Jennifer Hill, a noted corporate law scholar, however, argues that the tradeoff of control was made at the same time that the courts moved the focus of
corporate law to the maximization of shareholder wealth. 2 1 In other words,
the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and management
126
was resolved by the fiduciary nature of the duties placed on management.
Although shareholder primacy was developed by U.S. courts in the
1830's in terms of receiving dividends and voting, 2 7 the view of shareholder
120

FARP.RAR, supra note 2, at 11.

121

Id. at 11 n.37 & n.40.

122

David Wood stated that:

[i]ndeed, passive investing may be looked upon as a morally questionable activity, dividends
being quite undeserved. Adam Smith expressed very little concern for such an investor. He
castigated what he referred to as 'proprietors' of joint stock companies, for they: 'seldom
pretend to understand any thing of the business of the company; and when the spirit of faction
happens not to avail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly
such half yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to them.'
Wood, supra note 27, at 275 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 699 (Random House ed.
1937)).
123
Wood, supra note 27, at 276.
124 See David Millon, FrontiersofLegal Thought: Theories ofthe Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,222
(1990) [hereinafter Frontiersof Legal Thought].
125
Hill, supra note 50, at 42-61.
126 Fiduciary duties are placed on directors, not managers, but the term management is used to keep
linguistic symmetry and emphasize the idea of operators versus owners.
I'7
D. Gordon Smith, The ShareholderPrimacyNorm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 296 (1998).
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wealth as the focus of the corporate enterprise was not pronounced by the
courts until the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company.128 In Dodge, the
court opined that "[a] business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end." 29 Managers have followed this lead130 and
generally welcomed the focus because the holding simplified their responsibility and tied their success to clearly and easily measurable outcomes. 3'
In regulating corporations more recently, however, some governments have
broadened the earlier restrictive laws that precluded non-shareholder
interests. 32 In doing so, the hope was that corporations, specifically directors, would consider other interests of the broader community or social
development concerns. 3 3 Therefore, shareholders view the pursuit of nonshareholder interests, including stakeholder interests, as a tax or misuse of
the private property of the shareholders.'
In summary, the main idea is that the parties who put up the money for
the enterprise, the shareholders, should have the right to control; they should
be the sole concern of the enterprise. From the management perspective,
current proponents of shareholder primacy, such as the Harvard Business
scholar Michael Jensen, argue that "value maximization says that managers
should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of
135
the firm."
128
129

130

170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).

Id.
Smith, supra note 119, at 278 (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, ParticipatoryManagement Within

a Theory of the Firm 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 657-71 (1996)). Note that Smith argues the contrary: in his view,
shareholder wealth maximization is not, and has not been, the norm in corporate law. Nevertheless,
Smith acknowledges that the consensus is the shareholder primacy norm. Smith, supra note 119, at 279.
131
Dean Clark describes the practical argument for this perspective:
A single, objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored than a multiple,
vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable accommodation of all affected interests....
[B]etter monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They are
more likely to do what they are supposed to do, and do it efficiently.
Orts, supra note 36, at 1604 n.204.
132
For example, thirty of the fifty states in the United States have enacted laws permitting
directors to consider stakeholders' interests. Millon, supra note 14, at 1375. See also Orts, supra note 36,
at 1598-1612.
133
This broadened ambit appears to have been used primarily, if not exclusively, in the
development of anti-takeover strategies, and not the true interests of the community at large. See
Corfield, supra note 6, at 230.
134
Frontiers of Legal Thought, supra note 116, at 227-28 (citing Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to IncreaseIts Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17).
135 Jensen, supra note 7, at 299. Jensen adds that the long-term interests of the corporation include
"equity, debt, preferred stock and warrants." Id. Interestingly, for purposes of the legal debate on
stakeholder theory, Jensen would be included with the stakeholders. Stakeholders are defined as
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The other main argument for shareholder primacy comes from the legal
foundation of the corporation. Corporations are founded by one or more
people, who contribute to a fund of capital for the purpose of carrying on a
business with a view to making a profit. These founding contributors are the
shareholders. As founders of an entity, shareholders have the right to control
the entity-the corporation.
B. Assumptions and Criticism
1. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER THEORY
Shareholder theorists fundamentally hold that the corporation is a free
association of individuals for the purposes of wealth generation. In their
view, individuals and more particularly, individual shareholders, must be left
without restraint to increase their wealth. They see wealth as the objective
or reason for social organization, and the more wealth, the better. The
distribution of that wealth is a matter of little or no concern.136 They have
a liberal view 37of property rights and oppose government efforts at
redistribution. 1
Most recently, shareholder primacy was brought into focus by the views
of the economist, Milton Friedman. In his highly controversial article, The
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,'138 Friedman argues that
the social good achieved by a corporation is to produce a profit. 39 He
explains, "there is one and only one social responsibility of business - to use
its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long

"variously, bondholders, suppliers, distributors, creditors, local communities ...[and] users
Dunfee, supra note 5, at 131.

.

Cox, supra note 34, at 434. When the issue of distribution is raised, shareholder theorists tend

13

to deal with it by addressing the matter to R. Coase whose theory in simple terms is that where transaction
costs are zero, initial allocation of rights is unimportant. R. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 1J. OF LAW
AND EcON. 1 (1960). Unfortunately, this appears to be a misreading of Coase. See N. MERCURO & S.
MEDEMA, EcONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 56 (1997).

137

Cox, supra note 34, at 404-06.

138

Friedman, supra note 32, at SM 17.
Id. Millon points out that Friedman was well aware

139

that profit seeking can generate externalities, and that various members of the public may be
affected adversely. The question for Friedman was how such problems ought to be addressed,
and he took for granted that a government accountable to the public, rather than private
initiatives undertaking in the boardroom, should make the necessary cost-benefit decisions.

David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of CorporatePersonhood,2 Stanford Agora: An Online Journal of
Legal Perspectives (2001) at http:/agora.stanford.edu/agora/cgi-bin/article2_corp.cgi?library=millon
[hereinafter The Ambiguous Significance of CorporatePersonhood].
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as it... engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud."
Additionally, he states that "[f]ew trends could so thoroughly undermine the
very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their
stockholders as possible." 141 Friedman and other profit maximization
theorists 4 2 make social welfare the ultimate justification for the exclusive
focus on profit. In other words, the good end is social benefit, which will be
achieved by ignoring that benefit and focusing exclusively on another end,
which is shareholder wealth maximization. 43 Hansmann and Kraakman, the
authors of the frequently cited work The End of Historyfor Corporate Law,
argue:

[t]he point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and
experience, there is a convergence on a consensus that the best
means to this end-the pursuit of aggregate social welfare-is to
make corporate managers strongly accountable
to shareholder
144
interests, and.., only to those interests.
In other words, Hansmann and Kraakman are arguing to prevent any other
stakeholders from consideration and to prevent any other stakeholder
interests from being considered. They claim a "convergence on a consensus" 45 or in other words, that there is a general agreement forming accepting
the shareholder primacy model--despite the fact that there is no such
agreement occurring as demonstrated by the stakeholder theorists already
discussed. 46 Their ultimate point, etching Friedman's justification, is that
147
shareholder primacy is "the best means to ... aggregate social welfare."
Therefore, this social benefit becomes the justification for shareholder
primacy.

140

To trace the development of the view before it became famous in the NewYork Times article,

see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
141

Id.

142

See e.g., Jensen, supra note 7, at 302 (stating that "[v]alue maximization is an important one
because it leads ... to the maximization of social welfare.").
143
This position shows a remarkable faith in free market economics discussed by economist
Joseph Stiglitz as "market fundamentalism." JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

35 (2002).
144
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 9. Note the same view reflected in Jensen's
comment that value maximization "has its roots in 200 years of research." Jensen, supra note 7, at 299.
145
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 9.
146

See supra Part IIIA

147

See sources cited supra note 32.
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A second series ofjustifications for shareholder primacy are based on the
shareholder's place in the corporation and associated rights. These additional
reasons are that shareholders: (1) hold the residual claims; (2) have the
greatest risk; (3) have the greatest incentive to maximize firm value; and (4)
have the least protection. 4 ' Still a third series of criticisms is leveled at the
foundation of the shareholder primacy model's notion of a unified single
shareholder constituency. 149 Finally, there are the more philosophical
questions examining the position of shareholders, the value of wealth, and
the nature of capital.
2. CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY
Given shareholder theorists' justification for their theory as producing
the greatest social welfare, one should ask whether this social benefit has
occurred. Economic studies do not support the increased welfare premise.
For example, in the United States, where shareholder primacy has advanced
over the last 30 years, there has been an increased concentration of wealth. 5 °
One finds a growing disparity between rich and poor, and a decline in the
In fact, corporate profits increased by 250
wealth of the middle class.'
which is the same period in which worker
1995,
percent between 1980 and
15 2
compensation declined.
On a global level, the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund 5 3 have opened borders to shareholder
primacy corporations, but failed in increasing general social wealth or widely
distributing the benefits of corporate activity. 5 4 The activities of these
transnational corporations seem to do the opposite; they increase the
148

Hill, supra note 50, at 11.

149

See Hu, supra note 87.

150

Michael Parenti, The Super Rich Are Out of Sight, COMMONDREAMS, December 27, 2002,

http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/inequali2002/l227superrich.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
1
"The 400 wealthiest taxpayers accounted for more than 1 percent of all the income in the
United States in the year 2000, more than double their share just eight years earlier." David C.Johnston,
Very Richest's Share ofIncome Grew Even Bigger, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at Al. Clearly, there
are many reasons for such disparities such as government policies, performance of the economy, and
changes in the labor force resulting from globalization, but the disparity noted parallels the shift away
from stakeholder thinking and seems to suggest that shareholder primacy cannot be supported along these
lines. See Frontiers of Legal Thought, supra note 124, at 229-30 (regarding the triumph of shareholder
primacy in this era). See also McQuaig, supra note 30, at 97-107.
152
See Gordon,Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM.L. REv. 1519,1530-32
(1997) cited in Hill, supra note 50, at 63 n.179.
153
See McQuaig, supra note 30, at 82-92 (regarding the discussions ofJoseph Stiglitz, former chief
economist at World Bank).
154

See DINE, supra note 9, at ch. 5.
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concentration of wealth and increase the disparity between the rich and the
poor.155 Accordingly, shareholder primacy as a general principal or a specific
mechanism cannot be supported on the basis that the primacy benefits
society overall.
Four reasons for the shareholder's position in the corporation are
addressed in the following paragraphs. The four claims are that shareholders:
(1) hold the residual claims; (2) have the greatest risk; (3) have the greatest
incentive to maximize firm value; and (4) have the least protection.1 56 As to
the first reason, the only time shareholders have the actual residual claim is
when the corporation is in bankruptcy or being wound-up.157 Rarely is a
corporation wound-up. Although bankruptcies have become more common,
winding up is not generally considered a normal or desirable operating
procedure. Accordingly, to argue that shareholders deserve to have their
interests as the foremost consideration on the basis of their right to the
residual claim is hardly compelling. 5 '
The second argument concerning risk is also challengeable on two fronts.
First, one can raise a challenge using a comparison with the risks assumed by
other stakeholders such as employees. Second, one can raise a challenge by
comparing shareholders' risks with the risks and position assumed by other
corporate financiers. One very important strategy for risk management is the
exit option. With respect to publicly traded corporations, there is a highly
liquid market for shares and at practically any point if the shareholder deems
the risk unacceptable, then a party's shareholdings can easily be sold. In
contrast, other stakeholders, such as employees who bear the risk of
unemployment and who lack the general ability to withdraw their investment,
shareholders appear to have less risk." 9
Shareholder primacy advocates argue that the risk shareholders take as
equity investors is significantly different and greater than other capital
providers. This argument is premised on a clear distinction between debt
and equity. As Hill demonstrates, in a careful examination of the role of
equity and the nature of equity in modern corporate practice, this distinction
in contemporary corporate practice is very hard to maintain. She notes that
155

Id. at 151.

156
157

Hill, supra note 50, at 10-12.
Stout, supra note 21, at 1193.
Farrar suggests this residual claim is the basis of their right to vote. FARRAR, supra note 2, at

158

158 n.6.
159

Jennifer Hill, Public Beginnings, Private Ends-Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of
Shareholders? 9 AUST. J CoRP. L. 21, 27 (1998) [hereinafter Public Beginnings, Private Ends]. See also
Corfield, supra note 6, at 216, n.15 (citing Margaret M. Blair, Wealth Creation and Wealth Sharing: A
Colloquium on CorporateGovernance and Investments in Human Capital, BROOKINGS INST. (1996)) (noting
that employees lose a 10%job specific premium when the lose their jobs).
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"with the rise of more complex funding instruments the traditional
distinction between debt and equity fails to accord with economic reality and
looks artificial, arbitrary and increasingly pass6. 6 Furthermore, the
disaggregation of equity investments, dividing the risk and control
components, makes the notion of shareholder as risk bearer much less
compelling.' 6' In fact, Hill believes that the courts are more likely to
consider the interests of other financiers ahead of shareholders and the
corporation's success or failure is independent of any particular interest
group, including shareholders, in part because the higher exit barriers faced
by other financiers make them as a group more vulnerable than the
shareholders. 62
Moreover, Hill explains that the long-term involvement of some lenders
causes them to have much more at stake than shareholders who have the easy
exit option in a precarious financial situation. 163 Thus, the controlling
positions of some lenders in securing their funds, but also in the operations
of the corporations, makes them more like insiders than the traditional
outsider role of creditors. However this situation, which she argues is the
corporate reality, is not consistent with the shareholder primacy model
advocated by shareholder primacy theorists. 164 This point of the more
intimate or tied relationship of non-equity financiers is pressed further in a
closely held corporation, where the creditor has a greater right of ownership
to the cash flow of the corporation than the shareholder once the corporation
has assumed the debt. 165 Therefore, shareholders are merely one group of
financiers, whose characteristics do not fit the description set out by law and
economics scholars. 166
A third argument supporting shareholder primacy is that shareholders
have the greatest incentive to see that the corporation profit suffers from its
own weakness.' 67 While shareholders may be eager to see the value of the
corporation maximized, there are certainly others with the same interest.

160

Public Beginnings, Private Ends, supra note 159, at 27.

161

Id.

162

Id. In such instances the courts turn to the notion of the best interest of the corporation. See

Sommer, supra note 13, at 46-51. See also Bottomley, supra note 3, at 284.
163
Public Beginnings, PrivateEnds, supra note 159, at 26.
164
Id.
165 Stout, supra note 2 1, at 1190-94 (noting that shareholders have a first claim on profits and that
they only have a claim on profits when the corporation is (a) profitable and (b) the directors declare a
dividend).
66
In his criticism ofSalomon, Farrar notes, "[It] tipped the balance too far in favour of the equity
investor at the expense of general and particularly involuntary creditors." Frankenstein, supra note 86, at
144.
167

See Hill, supra note 50.
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Groups, such as employees seeking job security, as well as directors and
managers whose income may be directly tied to this measure (and those who
lack the diversified portfolio common to shareholders), have a greater
interest in seeing maximization than shareholders. The position that
shareholders have the greatest interest in corporate profits, however, ignores
the diversity among shareholder interest, including those parties taking a
short position on the shares. Furthermore, profit and wealth are arbitrary
abstractions that hold no innate value commanding a privileged position.
Wood observes,
there is no 'prima facie' moral, as opposed to prudential, reason, why
profit should be promoted, let alone maximized. Profit is a mere
accounting concept, and profit-maximization is at most a highly
artificial goal. Profit is certainly not in its own right a 'morally
important social value' such as: 'the protection of the environment,
the advancement of knowledge, the development of culture, the
promotion of social prosperity,
the fostering of community, and the
16
protection of public health.' 1
Wood's point here is that compared to more universally-accepted values,
wealth and profit fare poorly. As values, they do not attract the same type of
universal acceptance or support. From Wood's perspective, the objective of
shareholder wealth maximization appears to be the objective of corporate
activity and, when contrasted with other valuable objectives, the shareholder
primacy model comes up lacking. 169 This argument assumes an alignment
of corporate interests and shareholder interests, as well as an identification of
corporate profit with shareholder wealth. Neither of these assumptions,
however, is tenable.
A fourth argument for shareholder primacy is that shareholders are in the
most vulnerable or least protected position in the market. Compared to
other sources of capital, shareholders have the least protection. Unlike
168
Wood, supra note 27, at 10 (quoting C. McMahon, The Political Theory of Organizations and
Business Ethics, 24 PHILOSOPHYAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 292, 299 (1995)).
169
Id. See Paula Dailey, To Whom it May Concern: FiduciaryDuties andBusinessAssociations, 26 DEL.

J. CORP. L 515 (2001). Dailey supports the shareholder primacy argument from a sociological analysis
of groups. She argues that corporations as purposive groups can include only shareholders because only
their interests conform with those of the corporate group, with each shareholder determined to increase
corporate profitability. This conclusion seems odd because shareholders do nothing to increase corporate
profitability other than wish for it. Furthermore, corporations and their shareholders have at times
different interests. Finally, Dailey's narrow view suggests that corporate interests such as increased market
share, CEO and executive egos looking to increase size through acquisitions cannot form a purpose. Such
a view is hardly supported by the facts. Id. See, e.g., Frankestein,supra note 56, at 150.
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insiders, they do not have information about the operations of the
corporation, and unlike bondholders, shareholders do not have security. In
addition to replies of the previous three arguments, which equally apply to
this contention, shareholders are not in the most vulnerable position.
Shareholders have the option of choosing to invest in whichever form of
contract they believe suits their specific acceptable combination of risk and
reward. In addition, shareholders are granted several special remedies at law,
such as derivative actions and winding-up the company onjust and equitable
grounds, denied to other stakeholders. "0 Finally, as previously noted,17 1 in
a stock market with so much liquidity, there is always the exit option.
A fundamental criticism of shareholder primacy arises from an
examination of the shareholder constituency itself. As noted, shareholder
primacy focuses on wealth maximization. 172 This leads to the question: what
is wealth maximization? Is it shareholder wealth, or is it corporate profit?
In a groundbreaking study, Professor Henry Hu identified a significant
difference between shareholder gain and corporate profit.173 Although Hu's
primary concern was investigating how corporate managers might more
effectively manage the corporation and deal with shareholders, he uncovered
some surprising tendencies. Hu found that shareholder gain does not
necessarily lead to corporate profit. 174 This fact creates a problem for
managers, who, on the one hand, seek job security with employment at a
wealthy corporation, while, on the other hand, must remain answerable to
17
shareholders seeking their own wealth. 1
In addition, Professor Hu analyzed the notion of common shareholder
176
interests. He notes that a number of conflicts exist between shareholders.
For example, shareholders disagree about the nature and amount of risk each
wants the management to take and they have different time lines regarding
long-term capital gain. 7 7 In other words, while some shareholders may be

170

There is discussion in Canadian corporate law concerning the meaning and applicability of

oppression remedies which may be available to non-shareholders. KEVIN McGUINESS, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 947-59 (1999).
171
See supra Part IV.B.2.
172

See supra Part IV.

173

Seegenerally Hu, supra note 87.
Id. at 302-06.
Various commentators have noted the undercapitalization ofUSA corporations where directors

174

175

under pressure from shareholders have taken too much money out of the corporation harming its long
term viability and competitiveness in order to put money into shareholder hands. See Benedict Sheehy,
The Importance of CorporateModels: Economic andJurisprudential Values and the Future of CorporateLaw, 2
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. LJ. 463, 502-03 (2004).
176
Hu, supra note 95, at 298-99.
177

Id. at 301-02.
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interested in the long-term growth of the corporation, others are similar to
speculators trying to take advantage of an acquisition announcement.178 This
critique leaves shareholder theorists subject to the same attack they level at
stakeholders; there is evidently more than one objective and managers cannot
focus on more than one objective.179 In this instance, the objectives include
corporate profit, shareholder wealth, short-term shareholder interests, longterm shareholder interests, high-risk shareholder interests, and low-risk
shareholder interests. Worse yet, the law has neither denied, nor validated
At this point, the law introduces yet
one shareholder over the other.'
another guidepost; namely, "the best interests of the corporation. " s8 By
adding the interests of the corporation, in addition to the interests of
shareholders, managers, employees and other stakeholders, the law instead
of clarifying, adds a further murky concept.
This brings us to the more fundamental question of why shareholders
should have their privileged position in the first place. Janet Dine, an
eminent British corporate law scholar, raises the question from the dynamic
aspect of the corporation. She observes that shareholders are necessary to
start the corporation and claim primacy on that basis, but from an operational
perspective once the corporation is up and running their role as founders
loses significance."u This foundational argument is even more seriously
challenged by the practice among lawyers of having sheif-companies, which are
companies organized and registered for the purpose of rapid and easy
deployment of a corporate vehicle in a commercial transaction. Once the
business corporation is operational, shareholders are an additional source of
capital, and in truth, the least preferred source of capital.' 3 From an
operational perspective, therefore, shareholders really have no privileged
for their voting power, their
position or interest.'84 In fact, were it8 not
5
existence would be of marginal interest.1

178

Id. at 296-97.

179
180

See generallyJensen,supra note 7.
Hu,supra note 95, at 301-02, 310-13. See also,Jensen,supra note 7 (arguing for the long term

as bringing together shareholder, creditor and warrant interests). But see Dunfee, supra note 5; Orts, supra
note 36, at 1575 (challengingJensen's view).
181 Sommer, supra note 13, at 46-51.
182
DINE, supra note 9, at 24 (applying it to concessionaire theories; however, this criticism applies
equally to the contractarian view being discussed here).
Public Beginnings, PrivateEnds, supra note 159, at 37.
183
184

See, e.g., FARRAR, supra note 2.

185

See Wood, supra note 27, at 7. Interestingly, non-profit corporations exist without difficulty

regardless of the fact that they are incorporated without shareholders.
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In a related vein, shareholder primacy theorists argue that shareholders
are true insiders, because they are founders."8 6 Hill's study of corporations
raises serious questions about the insider-outsider model of the corporation,
and in particular, shareholder claims to primacy based on their special role
as the ultimate insider. As previously noted, Hill's analysis, from the
perspective of corporate finance, suggests that other traditional outsider
financiers often play a much greater insider role than shareholders. 7 In
addition, the demarcation lines between debt and equity have been
sufficiently eroded to make ascribing one party "insider rights" denied to
other "outsiders" nearly impossible. 8 Furthermore, one has difficulty seeing
how such employees should be outsiders without some determinative power
day-trading shareholders should
over the direction of the corporation while
18 9
be considered insiders with such power.
Dean Horrigan of the University of Canberra School of Law criticizes
the shareholder primacy approach to capital. He observes that this definition
of capital in this model is too narrow or "monodimensional."' 9° Corporate
enterprise as a type of human enterprise relies on "economic capital, human
capital, intellectual capital, social capital and environmental capital."' 9 , In
reality, shareholders are just one type of capital provider among a vast
collection of providers, including employees who provide human capital,
creditors who provide debt capital, and suppliers and society that provide
educated, assimilated workers.192
Returning to the property rights argument for shareholder primacy, Hill
points out that the early aggregate or partnership model of the corporation
supported the view of shareholders as "owners" of the enterprise; hence,
their importance rested on the idea that their interests are "distinct and
inherently different" from other parties. 93 But as we have seen, the history
186

See DINE, supra note 9, at 24.

187

Public Beginnings, PrivateEnds, supra note 159, at 37.

188

Id.

189

Id. (citing Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and

Potentials, 4J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155,170 (1982)). Shareholder theory relies on a strong sense
of private property as opposed to public, which distinction has its own set of distinctive and fundamental
problems. Seegenerally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000).
190
Horrigan supra note 33, at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
191
192
See id. at 535, 540. Further criticism of shareholder primacy arises from the effects of a single
focus on wealth maximization. Presumably, somewhere down the line, the shareholders are ultimately
controlled by or at least for the benefit of humans, and surely humans have interests in more than wealth
maximization. Humans are interested in clean air and water, and a just society, and unless shareholder
primacy wealth maximization is restricted to preserve these goods, there will be no point to wealth
maximization. We will discuss the role of government and corporate law norms later in this paper.
193
Public Beginnings, PrivateEnds, supra note 159, § 3.
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of the corporation has moved it and its associated rights a considerable
distance from these roots. From a legal perspective, shareholders are not
"owners" of the corporation and accordingly, this argument fails. 194 Furthermore, as Stout observes, the options theory undermines at a most
fundamental level the notion of shareholder ownership.19
C. Replies to ShareholderPrimacy Criticismand FurtherCriticism
If shareholders are neither dominant in management or in control, nor
in terms of providing finance, why should they continue to have the level of
control they do? Why should they have the vote? 196 In order to answer these
questions in favor of shareholder primacy, one must accept a number of
assumptions about the nature of society, the role of business, the role of law,
the nature of economic problems and appropriate solutions to those
economic problems. 197 In the narrower context of corporations, if this view
holds that managers have one goal of wealth generation, then managers will
be clear on their objective and do what they are able to do best, which is the
generation of wealth.1 98 It is less efficient to have the corporation involved
with other social concerns, such as thejust distribution of wealth, which are
tasks that the corporation was not designed to perform. General social
welfare is outside the scope of corporate concern. Externalized costs are
acceptable in the creation of wealth since they are of minimal concern to
non-shareholders.199 Where costs are a concern, other societal organizations,
such as government, have the role and the responsibility to address these
costs or for non-shareholders to contract against those harms. °°
The argument has been advanced that perhaps shareholders should enjoy
the right to cause some general harm in the process of their wealth
maximization on the basis that "they value it more highly than non-

194

But see, Orts,supra note 36, at 1575 (noting that this is a mistake made by management theorist

Jensen); Stout, supra note 21, at 1191-92 (noting that this is a mistake made by economist Milton
Friedman).
195
Stout, supra note 21, at 1191-92.
1%
See Wood, supra note 27. As noted earlier, Wood argues shareholders gave up these rights when
they surrendered responsibility for the corporation. See supra Part WA
197
See generally Benedict Sheehy, The Importance of CorporateModels: Economic andJurisprudential
Values and The Future Of Corporate Law, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L. J. 463 (2004) (discussing these
assumptions in detail).
I"
Id.
199
Benedict Sheehy, Corporationsand Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study 24 J.L. & COM. 1
(2004).
20
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shareholders would value the right not to be harmed." 20 1 Millon observes
that at a factual level, non-shareholders tend to suffer more from shareholder
exploitation than shareholders would suffer if they were not permitted the
right.2 °2 This allocation of rights is based on the market notion of bargaining
power. Millon raises the crucial question of why bargaining and bargaining
power should be the basis of protection from the harmful effects of
shareholder wealth maximization in the first place.20 3 Is our society to be
organized to protect only those with greater bargaining power? Justice
seemingly requires a very different approach to social organization.
A further criticism of shareholder primacy comes from the nature of
shareholders themselves. Shareholders are by and large passive. As Hill
observes, "[shareholders] invest in the investment, not in the corporation." 2°4
They are not interested in building, operating, or controlling the corporation.
When problems in the corporation become evident, shareholders prefer to
exercise exit rights rather than working to resolve the situation.2 s
There are also some obvious factual arguments against shareholder
primacy. Contrary to the claim that stakeholder corporations cannot
function because of diverse objectives, in many places the law has
successfully and without undue diminution of wealth by shareholders or
society, integrated stakeholder theory. Whether one chooses to look at
European corporations with their two tiered boards, or employee, creditor,
and environmental liabilities placed on directors in Anglo-modeled corpora-

Millon, supra note 14, at 1378.
See Millon, supra note 14, at 1384.
Millon, supra note 14, at 1384. Millon states,
[O]ne might argue that shareholders should enjoy this right because they value it more highly
than nonshareholders would value a property right not to be harmed. One response is to
question the validity of the factual assertion. Many nonshareholders lose far more from
shareholder exploitation of nonshareholder vulnerability than would shareholders if such
opportunities were impeded. Ifan entitlement were with nonshareholders, shareholders would
presumably sustain a somewhat lower rate of return on their investments (unless job security
and other protections actually resulted in heightened productivity). In contrast, as long as the
entitlement is with the shareholders, workers, for example, are vulnerable to the loss of their
jobs and attendant human capital investments, to the prospect of potentially lengthy
unemployment or inferior reemployment, and to the morale costs generated by insecurity. It
seems reasonable to assume that workers would value ex ante protection more highly than
would shareholders value a right to harm.

201

2
M

Id.
M
Hill, supra note 50, at 57 (quoting Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate
Managers:A Comparative Perspective,57 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1991)).
205
See FARRAR, supra note 2, at 13. However, also note that shareholders are unlikely to expend
the effort to get involved to resolve these problems as management per se is not likely to be their area of
expertise and furthermore, there is the disincentive of the free-rider problem. Id.
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tions, one finds that directors have successfully incorporated the conflicting
concerns of their various constituent stakeholders in the supposedly
exclusive shareholder model. °6 One study indicates that managers understand the different objectives demanded by the difference between
shareholder value
and traditional accounting and have adapted their behavior
2°7
accordingly.
Shareholder primacy theorists also tend to ignore empirical studies
demonstrating the success ofstakeholder-oriented corporations. 0 8 In reality,
even in the United States, which is arguably thejurisdiction most committed
to shareholder primacy, the law permits considerable latitude to management
to deviate from shareholder primacy.2°9 Even among shareholder primacy
advocates, the levels of deviation from shareholder primacy are noted.
Whether one notes Friedman's caveat restricting shareholder wealth
maximization to "conforming to the basic rules of society,"21 ° Jensen's
deviation from shareholder supremacy being modified by his concern for
creditors, n or Hansmann and Kraakman's departure from pure shareholder
interests which causes them to state "creditors, to be sure, are to some degree
an exception" 212 (with no reason for the exception), shareholder supremacy
appears unsatisfactory even to its most outspoken advocates. This deviation
from strict shareholder supremacy suggests that these advocates recognize,
as others have noted, that the corporation213exists within society and relies on
the social goods or capital supplied by it.
From the above discussion, clearly the debate is complex and difficult,
if not impossible, to resolve within the parameters of the debate itself. To
move forward one must step outside the narrow confines of the debate and

206
BruceLangtry, Stakeholdersand the Moral Responsibilitiesof Business, 4 BUS.ETHIc SQ. 431 (1994).
See Wood, supra note 27, at 13-20 (explaining Langtry's "Tinged Stakeholder Theory").
M
See Orts, supra note 36, at 1589-90 (citing MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE DEFENSE:
SHAREHOLDER POWER & CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 4-5, 10-11 (1993)).

M
See Mohammad Omran & John Pointon, Shareholders versus Stakeholders: Corporate Mission
Statements and Investor Returns, 11 BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REv. 318 (OCT. 2002) (conducting a
5 year longitudinal study of companies on the FTSE). Simon Webley & Elise More, Does Business Ethics
Pay?-Ethics &FinancialPerformance, INST. OF BUS. ETHICS (2003).
W
See Dunfee, supra note 5, at 9-10. But see Sommer, supra note 13 (viewing the latitude to be
limited to long-term shareholder interest). See also, DINE, supra note 9, at 37 n.3 (citing the contrary
argument of BLUMBERG, THE AMERICAN LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS (McCahery, Picciotto, & Scott,
eds., 1993)).
210
See Dunfee, supra note 5, at 9-10 (observing that Friedman's meaning is ambiguous and the
statement open to both broad and narrow interpretation).
211 Jensen, supra note 7, at 299.
212 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 10.
213 See FARRAR, supra note 2, at 409 (noting this idea of the necessity of society for the existence
of the market goes back at least to ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759)).
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directly address the ideological and technical considerations underlying the
tensions. From an ideological perspective, one should compare the political
neoliberal, 214 neoclassical economics 215 focus on private property, and its
generally anti-regulatory stance, with the social justice concerns of more
communitarian oriented scholars.216 These two opposing stances translate
into the discussion of nature and purpose of the corporation, in addition to
of corporate
the nature and purpose of corporate law. The four questions
217
governance can be answered from such an understanding.
V. MODELS OF THE CORPORATION AND THE DEBATE218

Models of the corporation are intimately connected to the shareholderstakeholder debate. One level of the debate hinges on one's theory of the
corporation. Models are both a starting point and a conclusion for the
various positions. Briefly, if one adopts the model of the corporation as a
series of private contracts between individual shareholders, there can be no
discussion about any interests but shareholder interests. If, however, one
adopts the model of the corporation as a concession from society, then one
may rightly claim some corporate obligations back to society. This section
briefly examines the various models of the corporation and the significance
of models for the debate. As Millon explains:
[a] standard argumentative move in these debates has been the effort
to justify a position for or against legal reform by reference to some

214

Neo-liberals as a political group are concerned particularly about individual liberties and in

particular private property rights.
215

Neo-classical economists are those economists who believe that most if not all of society's ills

can be solved by the use of micro-economic tools and models. Basically the tools and models are: humans
being mere rational utility maximizers, and left to function in perfectly competitive markets, everything
will be fine. See generally Sheehy, supra note 189 (discussing and critiquing these assumptions).
216
MALLOY, LAWAND THE MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAWAND
ECONOMICS 1 (2001).

To the traditional law and economics scholar the relationship ispositive, efficient, and wealth
maximizing. It is a relationship that inherently promotes autonomy, prosperity, and social
justice. To others, the relationship may seem exploitative, chaotic, and oppressive. It is a
relationship that fosters self-interested behavior and institutions of greed and profit.
Id. Malloy views the issue not as a tension between efficiency and social justice but rather, in applying
semiotic theory to the problem, Malloy frames the issues as a dynamic between creativity and efficiency.
Id. Unfortunately, his set of solutions are beyond the scope of this paper's analysis of the traditional
stakeholder-shareholder debate.
217

See supra Part I.

218

See DINE,supranote 9, at 3-28 (providing one view of the various models); Bottomley, supra note

3 (offering a different view).
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kind of characterization of the corporate person. A descriptive
assertion ("the corporation is x") is advanced on behalf of a
normative claim ("therefore y should follow"). In this way, what
might otherwise appear to be abstract, purely academic debates about
corporate legal theory in fact support controversial political
agendas.219
Broadly speaking, there are three main models of the corporation. 220
These models are: (1) communitarian concessionaire, or social, which
roughly approximates the entity theory; (2) the contractarian, aggregational
models; and (3) the socialist model, which will not be discussed, because it
2
has largely been abandoned with the decline of state-run corporations. 21
A. ContractarianModelimIn essence, contractarians view the corporation as a form of contract
between shareholders. 2 3 This theory posits the corporation as a private
matter between individuals, placing no additional duty on the corporation
other than that which exists on the separate individuals involved in the
corporation. 24 The corporation as a private matter should be subject to the
least possible government interference. There are two types of contractarians, legal and economic.22'

219

The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, supra note 139, at 3. For an in-depth

discussion, see Sheehy, supra note 197.
n
The terminology concerning corporate modeling is somewhat confused across the Anglo
traditions. This confusion arises because of a mix of legal, economic and management concerns, political
agendas, and different focuses at different times. Nevertheless, the issues facing Anglo and arguably all
legal systems in terms of governance are much the same. In the USA, the debate is usually characterized
as communitarians versus contractarians. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 14 (tying communitarians to
concessionaire views). For examples of how others use models differently depending on the focus or
interest, such as when the debate is described in terms of property versus entity, see, for example, Stout,
supra note 21, at 1190 n.6 (citing William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDozo L. REv. 261 (1992)).
21
For example, see the discussion in Michal Sewerynsli, Trade Unions In The Post-Communist
Countries: Regulation, Problems, And Prospects, 16 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 177 (1995).
M
There are other approaches to the analysis of corporations as voluntary collectives. See, e.g.,
Dailey, supra note 161, at 539.
M3
Coase, supra note 10, carried forward in Law and Economics scholarship by Bainbridge and
Farrar.

224
=

DINE, supra note 9, at 5.
See Bottomley, supra note 3, at 277-87.
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1. LEGAL CONTRACTARIAN MODEL

Legal contractarianism is the view that corporations arise when two or
more people come together to form a legal contract to carry on commercial
activity. 226 From Bottomley's discussion, we may note three aspects of legal
contractualism that are relevant to this discussion. 1 7 First, the contract
creates a legal entity in which directors and members are bound together in
the corporation's articles of incorporation.228 Second, the contract defines the
boundaries and membership of the corporation. 229 Finally, contractualism
favors the interests of members, rather than the interests of the individual. 3
The contract is an "unusual type," to say the least. 31
The model's weakness lies in the interpretation of the corporation's
founding articles or constitution. The "founding contract" is only
enforceable by shareholders despite the fact that others may be party to the
contract and, even then, shareholder legal remedies are greatly restricted. 32
A further problem is that the model posits the interests of the founding
contractors as being identical to the corporate enterprise itself. As Professor
Hu has demonstrated, however, this is simply not the case-corporate
interests differ from shareholders' interests as do shareholders' interests differ
among themselves. 33
As previously noted, Dine identifies the difficulty in applying this
foundational model to an operating company.234 Once a company is up and
running, the rights and duties of the parties in a corporation change.
Shareholders no longer have the absolute rights they had when the
corporation was founded, and in particular, their rights vis-a-vis directors are
weakened. As demonstrated in Foss v. Harbottle,"3 the directors have
independence from the shareholders and a level of immunity from
shareholders, even if the directors take an action contrary to the wishes of

n6
M7
22S
M9
2Vo

DINE, supra note 9, at 8-12.
Bottomley, supra note 3, 281-84.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 283.

231

Id. at 281.
Id. at 283-84.

23

M
2M
235

Id. at 284.

Hu, supra note 87. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.B.2
2 Hare 461 (1843). In this case, the court in its examination of minority shareholder rights
determined that the appropriate party to take action against directors is the corporation itself. Id. See also
FARRAR, supra note 2, at 171.
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some shareholders. This suggests that the corporation is more than a mere
contract between shareholders.
2. ECONOMIC CONTRACTAR[AN MODEL

The economic contractarian model finds its origins with the economist
Ronald Coase. 236 Coase first proposed that the corporation is a type of
firm. 7 By classifying the corporation as one type of firm, Coase is suggesting that the corporation operates as a more efficient means of production by
grouping people and inputs together, and that by combining tasks in one
enterprise the corporation is able to lower transaction costs." 8 In this model,
there is a direct connection and related accountability between the capital
providers-the shareholders and the managers. 239 Friedman simply stated
that "[an executive] has a direct responsibility to his employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance to
their desire, which
2
generally will be to make as much money as possible." 1
Contractarians reject the notion of the corporation being a body
independent of the shareholders and, in fact, reject the very idea of the
corporation. 24' According to this group, the corporation is merely a nexus of
contracts. 242 Logically, a corporation cannot have obligations distinct from
the obligations of its individual members. Therefore, the notion of corporate
social responsibility, as distinct from the responsibilities of the individual
shareholders, is a non-sequitor, a logical contradiction.
As Millon observes, the contractarian model favors shareholder primacy.
He concludes:
state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which
shareholders purchase management's undivided loyalty to their
welfare... to the extent that management's pursuit of shareholder

23
237
23

See generally Coase, supra note 10.
See generally id.
See generally id. See also, Frontiers ofLegal Thought, supra note 116, at 229-32 (discussing Coase
as the source of the 1980's nexus of contracts theorists). The issue for economic contractarians is: How
the owner-shareholder principal can control and limit the manager-agent sufficiently to minimize
"managerial opportunism" or "agency costs." They find answers in the markets for capital, corporate
control and management skill, and secondarily in the body of corporate law. Bottomley, supra note 3, at
285-87.
239

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 35, at 37-38.

240

Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times
Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970,32-33, 122-26.
241

See FARRAR, supra note 2, at 30.

242

Id. at 30 n.69 (stating that concept was pioneered by Coase).
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welfare threatens nonshareholder interests, workers, creditors, and
other affected nonshareholders are free to bargain with shareholders
(through their agents) for whatever protections they are willing to
pay for. This view assumes that feasible (that is, not excessively
costly) contracting strategies exist for correction of the harmful
external effects of shareholder/management activity and, perhaps,
that such effects are relatively uncommon.2 43
Millon presents the underlying philosophy that everyone involved in the
corporation is there on the basis of free bargaining; that those involved or
affected by the corporation are entitled to what they are willing to pay for,
and that corporations and corporate activity is generally benign.
The contractarian model has a number ofshortcomings. The model fails
to explain the most significant feature of the corporation, limited liability. 2"
Contractarian models also fail to adequately address other corporate rights
such as the corporation's right to hold property and the right to freedom of
expression, which are rights held independently of its members. The
univocal focus on efficiency245 supported by contractarian models raises the
question ofwhy efficiency should be set as the prime value. Millon observes
that "[r]eferences to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why
efficiency should provide the sole normative criterion. As a society, we have
not embraced the market as a totalizing model for the definition of rights and
responsibilities. " 14 ' Furthermore, this focus on the bottom line always
creates a strong incentive to externalize costs, increase production, and
thereby increase profit.247 On this point, Horrigan observes, "[flinancially
243
244

Millon, supra note 14, at 1378.
Dine notes the state involvement in creating the limited liability aspect of corporations. This

grant of limited liability is what made corporations such an attractive option for conducting business and
essentially what gave rise to their dominance in commerce. The explanation that this would eventually
have been contracted for, according to Dine, is not supported by the facts. See DINE, supra note 9, at 4.
245
As Robin Malloy points out, contractarians' efficiency focus follows closely on the economists'
view that creating wealth is the sole objective of corporate activity. Any increase in wealth (a) is a social
benefit, and (b) it permits turning a blind eye to the distribution of that wealth or the costs of producing
that wealth. Kaldor-Hicks theorem suggests that as long as there is an overall net gain in a transaction,
regardless of the size of the loss sustained by any party, the parties should be coerced into the transaction
for the benefit of the overall gain. See MALLOY, supra note 208, at 65. This author believes that this
position seems to undermine some of the fundamentals of property rights that form the basis of the
contractarian argument. Dine observes that in the contractarians model, the role of government is to
create a more perfect market by correcting market failure. DINE, supra note 9, at 109. Economic
contractualists believe that allocation efficiency is best served by permitting the market to adjust supply,
demand, and costs with the least interference. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 35,37-38.
246
Millon, supra note 14, at 1386.
247
DINE, note 9, at 9; MALLOY, supra note 8, at 154-55.
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based shareholder focus ... allows corporations to externalize the costs of
maximizing stock prices onto everyone except the stockholders; this includes
employees,
the environment, consumers, suppliers and the community at
248
large."

Contractarians are focused on internal corporate activity and apply a
cost/benefit analysis to a relatively narrow range of items that are more easily
subject to numeric measurement and analysis. A further criticism of this
view is its explanation of the one-person corporation where the shareholder
is also the director. How can one contract with one's self? The legal answer
to this question, of course, comes from the Salomon case 2 49 mentioned
previously. Thus, shareholder primacy advocates for and argues from a
contractarian model.2 s°
B. Communitarianor ConcessionaireModel
Communitarian or concession theorists note that corporate existence
owes its origins to a governmental concession.2 l In the beginning,
governments delegated and granted trading rights to corporations.2 52
Corporations were permitted to carry on only those activities authorized in
the concession granted by the government. This restriction was the basis for
the now out-dated doctrine of ultra vires as applied to corporate activities.
These limits on the concession were set out in the articles of incorporation
or constitution of the corporation. Given this concessionary nature of the
corporation, the government retained certain rights concerning the
governance and operation of the corporation. Further, as Bottomley argues,
"[corporations] themselves are systems in which power and authority, rights
and obligations, duties and expectation, benefits and disadvantages, are
allocated and exercised .... Each company is a body politic.
,,253 If one
accepts this view of the corporation, the argument for stakeholder
involvement or at least for government regulation is more understandable.
As a governmental concession, the corporation owes duties back to the

248

Horrigan, supra note 33, at 550 (quoting Corporate Citizenship:A ConversationAmong The Law,

Business andAcademia, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 723, 728 (2000)).
249

[18971 AC 22.

M

For a brief discussion of how Rawls' interestingly uses a contractarian model to argue for a
different result, see Millon, supra note 14, at 1377 n.19.
251

See DINE, supra note 9, at 21-25.

252

See id. at 21.

253

Bottomley, supra note 3, at 291.
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government. This obligation, however, does not extend automatically to
society.
Although concession theory may explain the foundation of the
corporation, the theory fails as an operational theory. Dine observes that the
concessionaire view is susceptible to the criticism that the corporation is no
more than a "mere fiction." 255 If the corporation is not made up of the solid,
physical shareholders acting in concert to create a common enterprise, then
the corporation has no more substance than a mere idea. The theory does
not explain by whom or how the corporation is to be run. Nor does the
theory set any limits on state involvement. Indeed a pure concession view
allows the corporation to be a mere instrument of the state.25 6
Models by definition are inadequate representations of that which they
21
In the context of corporate law, this limitation of
attempt to represent. 25
models is exacerbated by the complexity of the subject. Orts observes:
To say 'corporation' is not like saying 'chair' or 'dog.' The reality to
which 'corporation' refers is more complex than an easily identifiable
material thing or animal, and any attempt to force a preconceived
theory on a complex legal reality results in what Hart calls
'contrivances varying with tastes.' The idea of the corporation is
complex precisely because it involves various relationships that
presuppose the rules and principles, and methods
of enforcement
25
and compliance that compose a legal system.
Orts' point is that to fail to understand the nature of the concept we are
dealing with leads to facile analysis of a highly complex phenomena. In fact,
Orts observes that "[a] survey of competing theories of 'the corporation'
leaves one to conclude that none has survived intact."25 9 The contractarian
fails to account for such things as the constitutional and limited liability
aspects of the corporation while the communitarian visions fail to address
effectively the behavior of players within the corporation. The criticisms of
the various models leads us to conclude that neither contractarian nor
communitarian models truly capture or fit the corporation.

254

See DINE, supra note 9, at 2 1.

255

Id. at 24.

2%

Id.

As statisticians, George Box and Norman Draper have observed, " [aill models are wrong, the
practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful." GEORGE Box & NORMAN DRAPER,
EMPIRICAL MODEL BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 74 (1987).
258
Orts, supra note 36, at 1572.
257

259

Id. at 1570.
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C. The Historyand the Development of Models
The contractarian and communitarian/concession models follow a
historical development, which do not lead to any one conclusion as to the
correct or appropriate model of the corporation. 260 At the time of
monarchical domination of trade, the communitarian/concession theory
most accurately reflected the state of affairs. In addition, the state's
involvement in the creation of corporations through acts of legislature, for
example, also provided weight to the argument for state involvement and
enforcement of broader social interests. With the development of the
discipline of economics, the application of economic theory to law and the
increasing interest in efficiency and its relation to wealth creation, the
contractarian models began to take shape and move into a position of
prominence.2 6 ' As a result, the model of the corporation became clear, the
appropriateness of the model came into question, and theories of private
property and the role of government in the market began to be reexamined.262
D. The IdeologicalDivide
Underlying this war of models is a much deeper ideological conflict.20
to
Shareholder advocates begin with the idea that people should be free 264
decide how to live, including how they should dispose of their property.
Millon explains that shareholder advocates focus "on the individual as an
autonomous being and . . . human liberty as freedom from external,

unconsented-to restraint." 265 Stakeholder advocates, by contrast, view the
individual as set in a social context; they view liberty as having positive
duties.2' From the stakeholder advocates' perspective, "[1]iberty is empty

260
261

For an extensive discussion of corporate models, see generally Sheehy, supra note 189.
Id. This application of economics to law gave rise to the sub-discipline of law and economics.

The efficiency concerns dominating the sub-discipline can be traced to its roots to the University Chicago
Law School which appointed its first economist, Henry Simons, in 1939 and particularly to the ground
breaking work of Ronald Coase' seminal analysis of the application of economics to the firm. See Coase,
supra note 10.
2
See generally, Sheehy, supra note 189.
2
The ideological facets of the debate are masterfully discussed in Cox's discussion, generally,
supra note 47.
264
Millon, supra note 14, at 1382.
Id.
265
26

Id. at 1383.
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without taking into account those primary needs upon which adequate
267
conceptions of individual dignity and human flourishing depend."
There are those who view the corporation as a social body.268 These
scholars view the corporation as a member of society, and a significant
member at that.269 They emphasize the power and effects of corporations in
society.270 In addition, they are, in Millon's words, "skeptical about the
practical efficacy of contract as a mechanism by which non-shareholders can
protect themselves ex ante from ...harmful effects."271 Others view the
corporation as a nexus of contracts between private individuals in which the
government has no business and by which the greatest efficiency can be
achieved, and that those without contractual bargaining power have no right
to be considered in the corporate contract. 72
At a fundamental ideological level, contractarians and communitarians
are deeply divided. Contractarians believe that justice is manifested in the
status quo and the only legitimate interests are those bargained for.273 For
communitarians, justice does not require endorsement of the existing
distribution of wealth and bargaining capability. Millon writes, "[t] hey seek
instead to reform corporate law so as to foster individual dignity and promote
societal welfare." 274 As Millon frames the debate, "what does set communitarians apart from contractarians is the communitarians' strong skepticism
toward the baseline presumption that contract alone should specify the terms
of corporate governance relationships." 275 Such deep ideological debates are
not going to be settled on the basis of superiority of models.276

2

Id.

268

See generally, Beth Mintz & Michael Schwartz, THE POWER STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN

BUSINESS (1985).

29

Of the largest 100 economies of the world, 50 are corporations. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK

DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1996).
Z70
Id. See also DOMHOFF , G. WILLIAM WHO RULES AMERICA NOW? (1983); MILLS, C. WRIGHT
POWER, POLrICS & PEOPLE: THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF C. WRIGHT MILLS (1963); MarkJ. Roe, A

PoliticalTheory OfAnterican CorporateFinance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991).
271
Millon, supra note 14, at 1379.
m72 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
Z73 Millon, supra note 14, at 1384.
Z74
Id. at 1386. Millon has also summarized the issue at a personal level, stating that "[h]aving
induced nonshareholders to rely on legitimate expectations of fair dealing, shareholders therefore may
forfeit the right to insist on contract terms guaranteeing profits at the expense of others." The Ambiguous
Significance of CorporatePersonhood, supra note 139, at 23.
275
Millon, supra note 14, at 1381.
Z76 See generally DINE, supra note 9 for a discussion on a view in which founding theories are
separated from operational theories. This view addresses the conflict between shareholder and stakeholder
interest arguments, but this view does not resolve the conflict as to how different interests should be
weighed.
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VI. A NORMATIVE COMMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE
CORPORATION AND CORPORATE LAW

From the foregoing discourse, the shareholder-stakeholder debate cannot
be resolved by looking at models, the history of the corporation, or by
looking at economics. Neo-classical, normative economics with its focus on
efficiency is fundamentally at odds with certain legal principles, such as nonoppression of minorities, human rights, and social justice.
The shareholder-stakeholder debate can be resolved, at least for
Westerners, by returning to first principles. Wood states, "[i]n short, [the
duties of business] is a moral question--or more precisely an extra- or prelegal question which typically involves complex practical and moral
factors."277 The eighteenth century British philosopher Edmund Burke
observed, "[t]he nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the
greatest possible complexity: therefore no simple disposition or direction of
power can be suitable, either to man's nature, or to the quality of his
affairs." 27 8 Burke's point is that society is a complex human endeavor, the
purpose of which is not at all clear, unified, or universally accepted.
Accordingly, we must shy away from one-sided, overly simplistic solutions
to the complexity presented by the human society in which we find
ourselves. The shareholder perspective as we have seen is an example of an
overly simplistic solution, which should be avoided.
Essentially, we must then ask what are the objectives of law in general
and of corporate law in particular? From the general perspective, Justinian
offers that the law ought to cause a man "to live honestly, not to harm
another, and give each his due." 279 As interpreted by the modern legal
philosopher, John Rawls, one of the pre-eminent jurists of the twentieth
century,justice in the distribution of society's goods is fundamental to ajust
society. 280 Rawls observes that '[s] ociety is a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage."281 He argues that we live in a world of limited resources, and that
ajust resolution to the conflicts concerning society's distribution and use of
resources is necessary to have a society in the first place. He suggests that is
society's enabling condition. s2

Wood, supra note 27, at 13.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 99 (Charles W. Elliot ed.,
Collier& Son 1909-1914) (1790).
Tn
JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTE, Book II 3 (cited in Frankenstien, supra note 86, at 148).
280 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
27

278

281

Id. at 4.

n2

Id. at 258-63.
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This view is also reflected in management literature. As Vinten notes,
"[T]o have any defensible property rights at all, one must recognize a
fundamental commitment to helping those in need." 283 Thus, law's proper
role for justice is to support such a distribution. Rawls suggests equality of
opportunity as the only way to prevent the stronger (or richer) in his just
2 4
state from overpowering the weaker (or poorer) is enforcing the maxim.
The power of corporations as concentrations of wealth, 8 5 political
power, 286 and as controlling cultural development 2 7 has long been
recognized. Legal scholar Wolfgang Friedmann noted in 1957 that "[t]he
corporate organizations of business and labor have long ceased to be private
phenomena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on the social,
economic, and political life of the nation is no longer a matter of
argument., 288 The current state of the law in Anglo countries, while
permitting shareholder concerns to be overridden in certain circumstances,
through constituency legislation and the business judgment rule, still places
a heavy emphasis on shareholder primacy.289 In fact, directors who wish to
include other stakeholders do so at their peril, both at law and in business.2 °
Judging by Rawls' principles, this state of the law cannot be correct.
On the level of the particular, one must ask and attempt to figure out
what is the purpose of corporate law. The contractarian answer is that
corporate law provides a set of off-the-shelf rules for the corporation; this can
hardly be correct. Nor is the shareholder primacy theorists' position of
wealth maximization correct. Wealth maximization, for all its popularity
among law and economics scholars, fails to meet some of the most basic
requirements for ajust society. The concept's complete lack of concern for
those without wealth makes the idea untenable as fundamental principle in
any society which has citizens living in poverty/ 91-and most certainly the
United States not to mention the rest of the planet-will continue to have
2

Vinten, supra note 31, at 380.

284

RAWLS, supra note 280.

See DINE, supra note 9, at 151-75.
NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE 91-120 (1999).
2V
See THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICALESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980
(Richard W.W. Fox, andJackson T. Lears, eds.) (1983); Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerismand Environmental
Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543 (1999).
288
Wolfgang Friedman, CorporatePower, Governance by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 155, 176 (1957).
2
See Sommer, supra note 13, at 39-46.
290 See, e.g., id. at 43-44 (stating that "[O]nly a reckless corporate advisor would permit board
minutes, or an accurate rendering of the advice given a board, to suggest that the board had put nonshareholder interests before those of shareholders.").
291 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 94, at 61. (discussing value as the preferences of people with the
money to pay for those values).
285

286
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poverty in the foreseeable future.292 Millon observes, "[n]either in practice
nor in law has society ever accepted the ruthless, single-minded
pursuit of
293
shareholder wealth maximization as a justified end in itself."
As seen from the previous discussion concerning the nature and models
of the corporation, understanding and defining the corporation is not294a
simple matter. Indeed, as Professor Orts observes, reductionistic modeling
is "not only unhelpful, but destructive., 29" The problem resulting from such
simplification can be seen in the economic argument for shareholder
primacy; namely, the betterment of society.296 The argument runs as follows:
first, by permitting the market to operate with the least restrictions, there will
be the greatest possible efficiency, creating the most possible wealth; and
second, this maximized wealth makes the greatest quantity of goods possible
available to society. In other words, the greatest social good is achieved by
permitting the markets to operate with the highest level
of efficiency with
297
corporations focused exclusively on wealth production.
Using Hart's rule-based analysis, Orts identifies complex results from
corporate law's normative conflicts.2 9' He discusses the following conflicting
norms: the divided economic object ofprofit versus wealth, short versus long
term, central management versus dispersed capital providers, capital

M

For a cogent criticism of Posner, see Whitney Cunningham, Testing Posner's Strong Theory of
Wealth Maximization, 81 GEo. L.J. 141 (1992).
S
Millon, supra note 14, at 1373-74. Millon goes on to write:
[f]or much of this century, at least since the publication of Berle and Means' classic in 1932,
the orthodox assumption has been that corporate law's objective is to develop legal structures
that will maximize shareholder wealth. This shareholder primacy vision of corporate law
therefore disregards claims of various nonshareholder constituencies (including employees,
creditors, customers, suppliers, and communities in which firms operate) whose interests may
be adversely affected by managerial pursuit of shareholder welfare. Managerial accountability
to shareholders is corporate law's central problem. Nonshareholder interests, if entitled to any
legal protection at all, are for other, noncorporate law legal regimes.
Id.
2
Models work by reducing complex phenomenon to simple, understandable concepts. While
reducing phenomena to a manageable level is necessary and important part of research to develop an
improved understanding of the phenomena, failing to re-inflate models to meet the reality they were
designed to help explain leaves the researcher investigating the phenomena with an inadequately truncated
perspective or understanding of reality. See BOX& DRAPER, supra note 257.
2%
Orts, supra note 36, at 1565.
2%
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
M
See DINE,supranote 9, at 112-14 (discussingthe fundamental flaws inherent in this argument).
The view of the corporation's role and participation in society is certainly Panglossian (referring to
Voltaire's character Pangloss in the novel, Candide, whose constant justification for the state of affairs was
that he was living in the best of all possible worlds).
2%
Orts, supra note 36, at 1570-74.
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accumulation, protection of investors, and the protection of other interests.
Orts also notes that following the law serves as an objective in itself by
referring to the thinking and terminology of Dean Clark who describes this
as "modest idealism. 300 In such instances, managers may cause a corporation
to take a course of action that produces a lesser profit, but complies with the
law when non-compliance would be more profitable for the purpose of
honoring the social-moral ideal of following the law.30 1 Finally, Orts notes
the ethical dimension of corporate law that allows for the noneconomic
considerations of ethics and justice.30 2 Orts observes that "policies
underlying corporate law cannot be reduced to a unidimensional value, such
as the economic objective of'maximizing shareholders' wealth' or even, more
generally, 'economic efficiency."' 30 3 A discussion ofnormative corporate law,
however, should go beyond a mere distillation of principles and objects in
the particular area of law.
Millon posits four norms for corporate law. He suggests that corporate
law should: "(1) promote stable relations between certain non-shareholder
constituencies and the corporation; (2) adjust the gains between shareholders
and non-shareholders; (3) address the fairness in allocation of transaction
costs; and (4) look for ways to include in decision making those most directly
effected by such decisions."3 4 Orts adds that "[c]orporate law, like most law,
is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring of social power, and it is
specifically about the rules that structure the organization of economic
power." 30 5 Therefore, by following Rawls, a strong argument can be made
that corporate law should include access to power by non-shareholders.3 6
Under such standards, Australia's Corporate Law Economic Reform
Program ("CLERP") objectives, which include market freedom, investor
protection, information transparency, cost effectiveness, regulatory neutrality

2W

Id. at 1587-1612.

3M

Id. at 1602. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 684 (1986).

301

Orts, supra note 36, at 1602 (citing Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in

PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55-79 (John W. Pratt & Richard Zeckhauser

eds., 1985)).
M
This is a summary of Orts' extensive arguments. See Orts, supra note 36, at 1587-1612.
30
Id. at 1587.
M'
Millon, supra note 14, at 1387-88. Interestingly, this fourth suggestion aligns with the
fundamental ideology of shareholder advocates whose emphasis on individual freedom requires consent
by the individual affected.
M5
Orts, supra note 36, at 1577.
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and flexibility, as well as business ethics and compliance, appear
inadequate." 7
Corporate law, like all law, should serve the betterment of society. Farrar
takes the position that the fundamental tenet of corporate law, the
independent legal entity doctrine, is fundamentally flawed and fails to meet
or promote any of the three criteria advocated by Justinian.3"' Wood notes
that the effect of limited liability is to pass on the costs of business failure to
others and, in the collapse of a big firm, a multitude of smaller victims or
involuntary stakeholders.3" 9 Corporate law that permits and promotes the
on-going externalization of business costs is contrary to the fundamental
principles of justice.31 ° Shareholder primacy creates another problem in
situations where hyper norms are involved. Such norms, argues Professor
Thomas Dunfee, "serve tojudge, and if necessary to invalidate, local laws and
local morality .... [They] 'entail principles .. .fundamental to human
existence .. 311
The effect of current corporate law, which emphasizes shareholder
interest, is just the opposite. Recent computer modeling of the current free
market economic model suggests that this concentration will increase, not
decrease.3 12 This trend of increasing concentration of wealth suggests that a
more fundamental modification to corporate law is required.
Corporate law, which permits and promotes increased inequalities
between members of society, is fundamentally flawed for the very reason that
the law contradicts the basic principles of justice. Admittedly, the
distributive aspect could be dealt with through tax law; however, the fact that
current Anglo corporate law, with its heavy shareholder focus, tends to
exacerbate social inequalities, both political and economic realms, suggest
that a profound re-examination of corporate law and corporate law reform
is well overdue. As Dine points out:
[corporations] account for most of the world's industrial capacity,
technological knowledge and international financial transactions.
They mine, refine and distribute most of the world's oil ... extract
most of the world's minerals ... harvest much of the world's wood
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...grow many of the world's agricultural crops, while processing
and distributing much of its food . . . hold 90 per cent of all

technology and product patents worldwide and are involved in 70
313
percent of world trade.
What Dine is drawing attention to is the fundamental issue ofjustice Rawls
has set out-the distribution of society's wealth, and hence, its power. From
Rawls' perspective one might ask, how a society that concentrates so much
of the planet's limited resources into the hands of a few-not to mention,
unelected-people can claim to be a trulyjust society. A society that tolerates
and continues to develop tools to perpetuate such injustice has become a tool
for the on-going and increasing injustice. Moreover, this injustice works
against the fundamental principles of democracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The shareholder-stakeholder debate is a highly complex, multi-faceted,
interdisciplinary debate; as such, it cannot be answered easily or
completely. 314 The broader perspective of the role of the corporation in
society seems to be the more realistic, logical perspective. If one takes that
to be the better position, then let us briefly put the four answers to the four
questions of corporate governance.
First, one must determine what entity is being governed. A combined
answer looking at legal, economic, social, and dynamic aspects provides the
best explanation. Clarkson offers the following answer:
[t]he Firm, is a system of stakeholders operating within the larger
system of the host society that provides the necessary legal and
market infrastructure for the firm's activities. The purpose of the
firm is to create wealth or value for its stake holders by converting
their stake into goods and services.31 5
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The second question asks who should govern the corporation. It should
be governed by a multi-tiered board, which includes other stakeholders.
This suggestion is not impractical as can be seen by the relative efficacy of
other stakeholder models of boards, such as the German model.
Third, the best way to govern the corporation must be determined. The
corporation can be well-governed by permitting it to pursue commercial
ends within more broadly drafted corporate statutes mandating a broader
range of interests and integrating into the governance structure people whose
interests more broadly represent the community of stakeholders affected by
the corporation. The disclosure requirements of shareholder theory should
be kept, but the accounting amplified to include "Triple Bottom Line" or
"Quadruple Bottom Line" regimes.
Finally, it is necessary to decide in whose interests the entity should be
governed. Given the great impact of corporations on society, the narrow
shareholder primacy view that advocates the operation of corporations for the
exclusive interests of people with sufficient wealth to be shareholders can no
longer be supported. Corporations must be run for the benefit of society and
cannot be merely instruments of the state.
Horrigan offers an interesting criticism of the whole shareholderstakeholder debate. He focuses on what he believes is the falsely dichotomous structure of the debate and suggests that a refraining of the issue, as the
effective functioning of different elements of society would serve all interests
best.316 Perhaps the best way to express this view as an aspiration for
corporate law can be found in the words of Orts, who states:
[w]ise policy makers ... should not convert the framework of corporate law into either an unfeeling gauntlet of economic madness,
nor an overly sanguine vision of do-good business. New directions
in corporate law should instead take society on a course that is
morally and politically uplifting, as well as economically produc317
tive.
The current and expanding stakeholder views may permit us to limit the
externalizing of social and environmental costs done in favor of maximizing
shareholder wealth, and ultimately save our planet from destruction by the
reluctant shareholder, who may state that "[t] he shadows of the things that
would have been, may be dispelled."31
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